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Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black
robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be hu-
man and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless
thinking machine.
Judge Jerome Frank'
Negroes don't have a chance at justice across the boards when all the
judges are [W]hite ....
Justice Thurgood Marshall'
INTRODUCTION
The public desires--and in many ways demands-a certainty to the
law. We all want to believe that the law is definitive and clear so that dis-
putes can be resolved cleanly, objectively, and fairly-or at least with the
appearance of fairness to all. However, as any first year law student will tell
you, that is not the law as we know it. Far from certain, "the law" evolves to
meet changed circumstances, is shaped by judicial philosophies and person-
alities, and must meet the specific facts and issues of the case at hand.3
The formalistic conception of the law as objective and certain is
closely related to the myth that, to quote Judge Frank, a judge is a "pas-
sionless thinking machine"' akin to a computer. Virtually every legal actor
understands that a judge's biases, perspectives, and life experiences influence
judicial decision-making. Not surprisingly, a judge's racial background
shapes her world view and almost inevitably influences her judicial deci-
sion-making.
This logic is often applied to juries. Trial lawyers fully understand that
the racial composition of a jury may determine the outcome of a case, and
the public fully shares this understanding. For example, no rebuke stings
more than the concise statement that an "all-White jury" convicted a
Black defendant.'
Perhaps more important than its tangible impact on the decision in
any particular case, racial exclusion of judges or jurors may adversely
affect the perceived legitimacy of the judicial process. Decisions are more
1. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 E2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943) (footnote omitted);
see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,JR.,TuE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (observing that judges share
prejudices "with their fellow-men").
2. Quoted in CARL T. RowAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: ThE WORLD OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHAL 283 (1993).
3. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Truth and Consequences of the Common Law as Social
Propositions, 23 UC. DAvis L. REv. 903, 904 (1990) (book review).
4. Linahan, 138 F2d at 652-53.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 178-82.
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likely to appear illegitimate if the decision-making body-be it a jury or
judge-is homogeneous, exclusive, and not representative of a cross
section of the community. The nation's stated commitment to
representative juries reflects this understanding and led to a system that, in
modern times, is designed to draw jurors from virtually all walks of life. In
fact, the law requires that the jury pool include potential jurors from a
cross-section of the community.6
Unlike the jury selection process, judicial selection at the federal and
state levels in the United States generally lacks any institutional structure
committed to ensuring diversity. Judges are selected on an ad hoc basis. In
many instances, politicians, who by definition are beholden to the major-
ity, select judges with relatively little oversight and without strong
pressures to ensure that the judiciary reflects a cross-section of the com-
munity. Of course, controversy occasionally surrounds judicial nominees,
such as Robert Bork in the 1980s7 and several of President George W
Bush's nominations in recent years," but those are the exceptions rather
than the rule.
In this vein, it must be noted that public opinion has played a role in
the judicial nomination process.9 Diversity has been demanded in the
nomination and appointment of state and federal judges, as it has with
many political and social institutions in American society. Despite public
pressure, there is a glaring lack of diversity among judges in the United
States, which troubles judicial observers." Professor Paul Brest has com-
mented that:
[]udges, especially federal judges, are far from a representative
cross section of American society They are overwhelmingly An-
glo, male, well educated, and upper or upper middle class. They
are also members of the legal profession-an affiliation that by
definition sets them apart from other members of society...
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. Robert Bork's nomination to the United States Supreme Court failed because
of the widespread perception that his conservative political views were too extreme. See
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990); PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT BORK AND THE
INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME CouRr's NOMINATION BATTLE (1992).
8. See Jeffrey Toobin, Advice and Dissent: The Fight Over the President's Judicial Nomi-
nations, NEw YORKER, May 26,2003, at 42.
9. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The Bush Administration and Appeals Courts Nominees, 10
WM. & MARY BIL RTS. J. 103 (2001) (discussing impact of public opinion on judicial
nominations).
10. See, e.g., Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice For All, 10 AsIAN L.J.
127 (2003); Maria Echaveste, Brown to Black: The Politics of Judicial Appointments for Latinos,
13 BERKELEY LA RAA L.J. 39 (2002); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond
Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2002) [hereinafter Ifill,
Beyond Role Models].
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Women, [B]lacks, and [H]ispanics are only the groups most
notoriously under-represented on the judiciary. There are
many others-for example, the poor, lower middle class, and
Eastern European ethnics-whose viewpoints are salient to
constitutional judgments."
Although made almost twenty years ago, this observation still holds
true today. Not surprisingly, this demographic profile has translated into
judicial decisions that reflect the shared backgrounds of the judges. As
John Hart Ely explained, there is a "systemic bias in judicial choice of
fundamental values, unsurprisingly in favor of the values of the upper-
middle, professional class from which most judges ... are drawn." 2
11. Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 664, 669 (1985). In Henry
Abraham's estimation, "[a] fusing of the background characteristics of the 102 individuals
who [up to 1985] have sat on the Court" provides a rather homogeneous picture; he de-
scribes them as:
NATIVE-BORN (there have been but six exceptions, the last two being the
England-born George Sutherland and Austrian-born Fehx Frankfurter);
WHITE (the first non[W]hite, Thurgood Marshall, was appointed in 1967);
MAN (there was no woman on the Court until President Reagan's ap-
pointment of Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981); GENERALLY
PROTESTANT (six Roman Catholics and five Jewish Justices); FIFTY TO
FIFTY-FIVE years of age at the time of appointment; FIRST BORN (fifty-
six); ANGLO-SAXON ETHNIC STOCK (all except fifteen); UPPER-
MIDDLE TO HIGH SOCIAL STATUS; REARED IN A NONRURAL
BUT NOT NECESSARILY URBAN ENVIRONMENT; MEMBER OF
A CIVIC-MINDED, POLITICALLY ACTIVE, ECONOMICALLY
COMFORTABLE FAMILY; B.A. AND LL.B. OR J.D. DEGREES (usually,
although not always, from prestigious institutions); SERVICE IN PUBLIC
OFFICE; from POPULOUS STATES.
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JusTICES & PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE
SUPREME COURT 61-62 (2d ed. 1985) (footnotes onitted); see also Theresa M. Beiner, The
Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAvIs L.
REv. 597, 600-03 (2003) (offering recent statistics on diversity of federal courts); Barbara
Luck Graham,Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on State Courts:An Overview, 74 JUDI-
cAruRE 28 (1990) (showing a similar lack of diversity among state court judges); Miguel A.
M~ndez & Leo P. Martinez, Toward a Statistical Profile of Latina/os in the Legal Profession, 13
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 59, 71-75 (2002) (providing statistical information showing the
dearth of Latina/o judges in the United States). For a thorough discussion of the back-
grounds of federal judges, see Sheldon Goldman, Federal Judicial Recruitment, in THE
AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL AssssMnEr 189, 194-200 (John B. Gates & Charles A.
Johnson eds., 1991).
12. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 59 (1980); see Brest, supra note 11, at
669 (contending that "judges' attitudes on important social and political issues do not
reflect those of the population at large"). But f Thomas R. Marshall, The Supreme Court
and the Grass Roots: Whom Does the Court Represent Best?, 76 JUDICATURE 22, 28 (1992)
(contending that the Supreme Court "has been relatively evenhanded in representing dif-
ferent social and demographic group attitudes").
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Appointments to the United States Supreme Court epitomize the
lack of diversity on the federal judiciary. Not until 1967 did President
Lyndon Baines Johnson appoint the first African American Justice,
Thurgood Marshall, to the Court. Since then, a more diverse group of
judges has served on the state and federal courts than throughout much of
United States history.'3 Much work remains to be done, however. Only two
African Americans have served on the Supreme Court; no Latina/os, Asian
Americans, nor Native Americans have ever served on the Court.'4 Few
African Americans, Latina/os, and Asian Americans and no Native Ameri-
cans serve on the federal bench today."5
Although demands for a more diverse judiciary are legion, scholars
rarely analyze the concrete impacts that diversifying the judiciary might
have on the operation of the courts, including better judicial decision-
making and improved public perception of the justice system. Even when
advocating for greater diversity among judges, few observers have clearly
described the concrete benefits to be gained by appointing and nominat-
ing a more diverse cadre ofjudges.
A notable exception, Professor Sherrilyn Ifill, contends that judicial
diversity is essential to ensure impartiality, public confidence, and the per-
ception that all members of society are represented on the bench.'
6 Ifill
offers at least two distinct rationales for racial diversity in the judiciary:
First, the creation of a racially diverse bench can introduce tra-
ditionally excluded perspectives and values into judicial
decision-making. The interplay of diverse views and perspec-
tives can enrich judicial decision-making.... Second, racial
diversity on the bench also encourages judicial impartiality, by
ensuring that a single set of values or views do not dominate
judicial decision-making.'7
13. See Chris W Bonneau, The Composition of State Supreme Courts, 85 JsuicATURE
26, 27 (2001); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew N. Lanier, Women and Minorities on State and Fed-
eral Appellate Benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84, 85 (2001).
14. For a discussion of the "representation" of minorities on the Supreme Court, see
BARBARA A. PERRY, A "REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME CoURT? THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION,
AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS (1991).
15. See Alliance for Justice, Demographic Overview of the Federal Judiciary, at
http://wvw.alhiancefo rjustice.org/judicial/udicia-selection.resources/selection-database/
byCourtRaceGender.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). For analysis of the causes of the lack
of diversity, see Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American
Courts, 10 MICH.J. RACE & L. 153 (2004).
16. See 1fill, Beyond Role Models, supra note 10; Sherrilyn A. Ifill,Judging the Judges:
Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REv. 95 (1997)
[hereinafter lfi,Judging the Judges].
17. IfiU, Beyond Role Models, supra note 10, at 410-11 (footnotes omitted).
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This Article further explores the substantive impacts that increased
racial diversity of judges might have on the decision-making process, as
well as whether or not the general public views the courts as fair and im-
partial tribunals. Building on previous analysis of the possible impacts of
the first Latina/o Justice on the United States Supreme Court,18 this Arti-
cle examines and evaluates with greater precision how increasing the
racial diversity of the judiciary will improve judicial decision-making and
lend greater legitimacy to the courts.
Specifically, this Article incorporates fundamental tenets of Critical
Race Theory-especially the concept of a "voice of color"-into the
analysis of the possible impacts of greater racial diversity on the bench. It
further compares judges and juries and contends that pulling a group of
judges from a cross-section of the community would both benefit the
decision-making process and improve public perception of the impartial-
ity of judicial decision-making, much as increased diversity among juries
has done. Indeed, many of the arguments for diversity among jury pools
apply with equal force to the judiciary.
This Article concludes by offering a principled position for support-
ing a racially diverse judiciary that does not demand support for every
minority nominee. With juries, we strive to impanel jurors who reflect a
cross-section of the community, but we still consider the individual char-
acteristics of prospective jurors in deciding whether they should serve on
the jury. We may reject any juror--minority or not-for cause, such as
bias against one of the parties or other indications that the person cannot
impartially decide the case. The same general approach should apply to
judges. Consequently, the evaluation of the ideology of a nominee is criti-
cally important in deciding whether he or she might bring new and
different perspectives to the decision-making process than those offered
by a predominantly White judiciary.
Part I of this Article considers the different voices and perspectives
added to the judiciary by the appointment of minorities. Part II analyzes
the many impacts of diversity on the bench, including greater judicial
impartiality. Part III sets forth the arguments supporting a diverse jury
pool and discusses how they inform the analysis of the quest for racial
diversity among judges. Part IV outlines a principled approach to the pur-
suit ofjudicial diversity.
18. See Kevin R. Johnson, On the Appointment of a Latina lo to the Supreme Court, 5
HAluv. LATINO L. PRv. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, On the Appointment] (published con-
currently in 13 BERKELEY LA RAzA L.J. 1 (2002)).
Racial Diversity on the Judiciary
I.VOICES OF COLOR AND THE JUDICIARY
Critical Race Theorists have written extensively about the "voice of
color" among minority law professors. Narrative scholarship, which poses
a challenge to traditional legal scholarship, 9 is premised on the under-
standing that minorities may offer a different perspective than White
scholars on civil rights issues.2" The body of literature regarding the voice
of color sheds light on the benefits of racial diversity among judges.
When discussing the voice of color, we wholeheartedly agree with
antiessentialists who contend that there is no single voice but instead a
multitude of voices of color.21 The Supreme Court provides a striking
example. Although both are African American, Thurgood Marshall and
Clarence Thomas approach the law from dramatically different perspec-
tives and could be expected to reach different conclusions in the same
cases; both, however, arguably write with a voice of color.12 Although ac-
knowledging great variation in views among judges of the same race, we
also contend that racial diversity among judges in the aggregate would
improve the decision-making process as well as the public's perception of
the justice system.
This Part discusses critically the notion of a voice of color among
African Americans and other racial minorities as judges and applies in-
sights from this concept to the particular voices of Latinas/os. It closes by
responding to charges that the representation of these particular voices on
the bench may result in judicial bias.
A. Different Voices
Critical Race Theory championed the concept of the "voice of
color,' the claim that minorities speak with a distinct voice or, put some-
what differently, look at the world differently from Whites.2 3 Narrative
19. See R.ICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 37-49 (2001). For a stinging critique of Critical Race Theory with a particularly
forceful challenge to narrative scholarship, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BE-
YoND ALL REASON (1997).
20. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
21. See DELGADO & STErANCIc, supra note 19, at 56-58; Angela P Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. R v. 581 (1990).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 29-33, 38-47.
23. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. Rv. 2411 (1989);Alex M.Johnson,Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J.
2007 (1991); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 323 (1987); see also Devon W Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2002) ("A central claim of Critical Race Theory . . is that
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stories told through voices of color can destabilize the conventional wis-
dom and facilitate social change. 4 As Richard Delgado has explained,
"[s]tories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for de-
stroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and
shared understandings against a background of which legal and political
discourse takes place."2
A voice of color analysis of the judiciary offers many insights. Judges
issue orders, make rulings, and render decisions; minority judges might be
expected to approach the law with a distinctive voice or perspective. A
diverse group of judges could logically be expected to bring a wide-
ranging set of views to bear on cases.
Interestingly, judicial nominees often try to skirt the question
whether their race would influence their decision-making. For example,
in his confirmation hearings, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that a
judge should dispose of his ideology and "be stripped down like a run-
ner."26 Such a statement is at odds with the Critical Race Theory concept
of a minority voice but entirely consistent with the view that judges are
the "passionless thinking machine[s]" to whom Judge Frank referred.27
1. Many African American Perspectives
Racial minorities have a history and tradition of speaking in a dif-
ferent voice than their White counterparts as lawyers, law professors, and
judges.28 By all accounts, Justice Marshall, the first African American to
serve on the United States Supreme Court, made unique contributions to
the Court because of his distinctive voice. Justice Anthony Kennedy titled
his tribute to the Justice: "The Voice of Thurgood Marshall."2 9 Justice
antiracist politics and legal theory should be informed by the voices of people 'on the
bottom' of discrimination.") (footnote omitted).
24. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 23, at 398-99.
25. Delgado, supra note 23, at 2413 (footnote omitted).
26. See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias
and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1201, 1201 (1992) (analyzing
Thomas's statement).
27. See supra text accompanying note 1.
28. See George A. Martinez, Philosophical Considerations and the Use of Narrative in
Law, 30 RUTGERS L. Ray. 683 (1999) (justifying use of narrative by outsiders because out-
siders offer different perspectives than Whites).
29. Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1221
(1992); see Melvin Gutterman, The Prison Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood Marshall, 56 MD.
L. REv. 149, 149 (1997) (observing that Justice Marshall's "special voice advanced the de-
bate" about the humane treatment of prisoners); Michael Scaperlanda, Justice Thurgood
Marshall and the Legacy of Dissent in Federal Alienage Cases, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 55, 55 (1994)
(predicting that Justice Marshall would be most remembered for "the voice he gave to the
voiceless").
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William Brennan emphasized that what made Justice Marshall unique
"was the special voice that he added to the Court's deliberations and deci-
sions. His was a voice of authority: he spoke from first-hand knowledge of
the law's failure to fulfill its promised protections for so many Ameri-
cans." 30  According to Justice Byron White, Justice Marshall
"characteristically would tell us things that we knew but would rather
forget; and he told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of our
own experience."" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote ofJustice Marshall's
deep influence on the Court and its deliberations." Many of Justice
Marshall's opinions--dissents as well as majorities-reflected the senti-
ments of many African Americans and others outside the mainstream, and
no doubt reflected Justice Marshall's life experiences. 33
Examples abound of minority judges who have brought new and
different voices to the judiciary. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, for exam-
ple, forcefully criticized racial discrimination against African Americans
in the United States.34 Judge Higginbotham also was an accomplished
scholar who wrote about the legal history of African American
subordination." Constance Baker Motley, who as a young attorney
worked on Brown v. Board of Education,3" is another prominent example of
an African American jurist who spoke with a distinctive voice on the civil
rights of Blacks. 37
Perhaps the most controversial contemporary African American
judge in the United States, Justice Clarence Thomas also writes with a
distinctively African American voice. However, he has a conservative
30. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HAiv. L. REv.
23, 23 (1991) (emphasis added).
31. Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215,
1216 (1992) (emphasis added).
32. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44
STAN. L. REv. 1217 (1992).
33. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
1129, 1131 (analyzing how Justice Marshall's experiences influenced his judgment as a
Supreme Court Justice); see also Gay Gellhorn, Justice Thurgood Marshall's Jurisprudence of
Equal Protection of the Laws and the Poor, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 429 (1994) (the poor); William
Wayne Justice, The Enlightened Jurisprudence ofJustice Thurgood Marshall, 71 Thx. L. REv. 1099
(1993) (ordinary people); Scaperlanda, supra note 29 (immigrants).
34. See Clifford Scott Green & Stephanie L. Franklin-Suber, Keeping Thurgood Mar-
shall's Promise--A Venerable Voice for Equal Justice, 16 HAR. BLAcKLT-ER L.J. 27, 35 (2000)
(analyzing voice of Judge Higginbotham); Anita F Hill, The Scholarly Legacy of A. Leon
Higginbotham,Jr: Voice, Storytelling, and Narrative, 53 RUTGERS L. RE. 641 (2001) (same).
35. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SH AnEs OF FREEDOM (1996) (analyzing role of
law in racial oppression); see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR
(1978) (studying role of race in United States law).
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. See CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1998).
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perspective with which many African Americans disagree.3" During his
confirmation hearings, Justice Thomas testified that he would speak on
behalf of the forgotten, just as Justice Marshall had done. 9 Thirteen years
into his tenure on the court, it is far from self-evident that he has done so.
For example, Justice Thomas has taken an aggressive anti-crime position,
which in the view of some observers has had deleterious impacts on the
African American community.
40 '
However, Justice Thomas's opinions at times reflect a deep under-
standing of the African American experience in the United States.
Unquestionably exhibiting an African American perspective in Virginia v.
Black,41 he observed in dissent that cross burning has historically been
used by White supremacists to intimidate African Americans. 2 In analyz-
ing Virginia's criminal law outlawing cross burning, Justice Thomas-a
son of the rural South-characterized the Ku Klux Klan as a "terrorist"
organization, a characterization that carries especially powerful connota-
tions after the events of September 11, 2001. He further stated that "cross
burning has almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably in-
stills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical violence.'"
Similarly, Justice Thomas wrote passionately-and with a distinctly
African American voice-about affirmative action in the 2003 University
of Michigan cases. He quoted African American icon Frederick Douglass
38. See John 0. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged Blacks-
From Clarence Thomas to "The Law School Five," 46 How. L.J. 175, 191-212 (2003) (discuss-
ing boycott by African American law professors of Justice Thomas's visit to the University
of North Carolina); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, just Another Brother on the SCT?:
What Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IowA L. REv.
(forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Onwuachi-Willig, just Another Brother] (analyzing
Clarence Thomas's jurisprudence as consistent with Black conservative thought); Mark
Tushnet, Clarence Thomas's Black Nationalism, 47 How. L.J. 323 (2004) (making similar
arguments). See generally KEN FosKErT, JUDGING THOMAS: ThE LIFE AND TDMES Of CLARENCE
THOMAS (2004) (offering biography ofJustice Thomas, focusing on his intellectual roots).
39. See Eric J. Muller, Where, But for the Grace of God, Goes He? The Search for Empa-
thy in the Criminal Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 15 CONST. CoMMENT. 225, 225-27
(1998) (reviewing Thomas's confirmation strategy).
40. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from majority's holding that the beating of an African American prison inmate
violated the ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eight Amendment); Mul-
ler, supra note 39, at 228-30 (discussing Justice Thomas's criminal jurisprudence and its
impacts on criminal defendants, a group in which African Americans are overrepresented
compared to their percentage of the population). In contrast, Justice Marshall was known
for his insistence that a civilized society must treat its prisoners humanely See Gutterman,
supra note 29, at 173-74.
41. 538 U.S. 343,388 (2003) (Thomas,J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 388-90 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross
Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (analyz-
ing Justice Thomas's impact on the rest of the Court in its analysis of Virginia v. Black).
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and stated that "[ljike Douglas, I believe [B]lacks can achieve in every
avenue of American life without the meddling of university administra-
tors. '4 4 Justice Thomas's views are consistent with his previous statements
about how he has personally felt stigmatized by affirmative action.45 His
views also reflect his conviction that self-help is the best strategy for Afri-
can Americans, a notion with a deep intellectual history in the African
American community.4 Justice Thomas' racial consciousness and conser-
vative views find their roots in those of African American conservatives.47
Another controversial African American jurist recently nominated to
the federal bench was also attacked for her conservative ideology. However,
Janice Rogers Brown, a California Supreme Court Justice nominated by
President Bush to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, may have a distinctive voice as an African American
woman of humble origins." As an Associate Justice on the California
Supreme Court, Brown, like Justice Thomas in the Michigan affirmative
action cases, wrote passionately in favor of color-blindness as the
fundamental principle underlying the Equal Protection guarantee and,
based on this principle, invalidated a public contractor outreach program.49
The NAACP and the People for the American Way took the
extraordinary-extraordinary because Brown is African American and the
NAACP, perhaps the leading African American advocacy organization in
the United States, generally supports increased racial diversity on the federal
judiciary--step of issuing a report strongly opposing Brown's confirmation
because she is a "loose cannon."5 "
As this discussion suggests, there is no single voice but instead many
voices of color, a fact highlighted by the antiessentialists of Critical Race
44. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-51 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); see Mary Kate KearneyJustice Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger: Can
Passion Play a Role in a Jurist's Reasoning?, 78 ST.JOHN's L. REv. 15 (2004) (analyzing Justice
Thomas's dissent in Grutter); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master's "Tool" to
Dismantle His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47
ARIz. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that Justice Thomas's professional life offers a
justification for affirmative action).
45. See Calmore, supra note 38, at 191-203.
46. See Onwuachi-Willig,Just Another Brother, supra note 38.
47. See id.
48. See Neil A. Lewis, Battle Lines Already Forming Against a Bush Court Selection, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, atA8.
49. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1083-84
(2000) (Brown, J.) (invalidating outreach program designed to increase bids by minority
contractors under California Constitution). For general criticism of the colorblind ap-
proach to equal protection jurisprudence, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution
is Color-Blind," 44 SrAN. L. REv. 1 (1991).
50. See PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY AND NAACP, "LoosE CANNON": REPORT IN
OPPosITION TO THE CONFIRMATION OF JANIcE ROGERS BROWN TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT (2003).
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Theory." Internal dissent may exist within groups, and a variety of views
exist within minority communities. s2 African Americans may be conser-
vative, such as Justice Thomas and Janice Rogers Brown, or they may be
liberal, such as Justice Marshall, Judge Higginbotham, and Judge Motley.
There is no reason to believe that Latina/os, Asian Americans, Native
Americans, or other minority groups are any different.
2: Other Outsiders
The concept of the voice of color arguably applies to all minorities.
Much has been written about Justice Louis Brandeis, the first Jewish per-
son to sit on the Supreme Court. 3 Some claim that his Jewish
background and experiences influenced his approach to cases and his de-
sire to protect individuals and small business. One commentator contends
that Justice Brandeis had a distinct impact on the evolution of the Erie
doctrine, a mainstay of the modern civil procedure law that deals with the
distribution ofjudicial power between federal and state courts.14
In this vein, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the first Jewish woman to
sit on the Supreme Court," has shown a particular sensitivity to gender
issues .16 Justice Ginsburg herself raised the provocative question of
whether a "Jewish seat" exists on the Court, 7 which implicitly acknowl-
edges that the Court is a representative institution similar to a political
body.
Similarly, many expect women judges, who have been appointed in
greater frequency to the bench since the 1970s,"5 to have a different voice
51. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 19, at 56-58. For a variety of perspectives
of African American judges, see LINN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE: PERSPEC-
TIVES FROM THE BENCH (1994).
52. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. R.EV. 495 (2001) (analyzing
evolution of dissent within various groups).
53. For biographies on Justice Brandeis, see LEwis J. PAPER, BRANDEIS (1983); PHmL-
LIPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM (1993); PHILLIPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS:
JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE (1984).
54. See Daniel R. Gordon, Revisiting Erie, Guaranty Trust, and Gasperini: The Role of
Jewish Social History in Fashioning Modern American Federalism, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213
(2002). For a critical appraisal of Justice Brandeis's position on race and civil rights issues,
see Christopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race Question, 52 ALA. L. REv. 859 (2001).
55. See Malvina Halberstam, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The First Jewish Woman on the
United States Supreme Court, 19 CARDozo L. Rv. 1441 (1998).
56. See infa text accompanying notes 68-71.
57. See Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, From Benjamin to Brandeis to Breyer: Is There a
Jewish Seat?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 229 (2002).
58. See Mary L. Clark, Carter's Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the Federal
Bench: His Other "Human Rights" Record, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1131
(2003).
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and perspective than men on many issues, with such differences affecting
judicial decisions. 9 Women judges may, in fact, bring different views to
bear than men on certain types of cases.' Intuition supports the idea that
women might well view gender discrimination cases, for example, differ-
ently than men.6" Suzanna Sherry has argued that a feminine voice may
inform constitutional adjudication,62 although it might not influence a
woman judge's approach to every case. 63 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
has spoken of the different perspectives of men and women but also about
how a "wise" man and a "wise" woman would reach similar conclusions
in the same case."
The first two women Supreme Court Justices, Sandra Day
O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have had a distinct impact on the
Court. For example, justice O'Connor coauthored a three-Justice opinion
re-affirming a woman's right to an abortion.61 With Justice Ginsburg join-
ing her dissent, Justice O'Connor objected to the Court's refusal to
invalidate a provision of the immigration and nationality laws that dis-
criminated against men and favored women on the basis of gender
stereotypes.66 Justice O'Connor wrote forcefully that:
No one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful
application of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence
concerning sex-based classifications. Today's decision instead
represents a deviation from a line of cases in which we have vigilantly
applied heightened scrutiny to such classifications to determine whether
a constitutional violation has occurred. I trust that the depth and
59. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DirEREr VOICE (1993) (contending that
women speak with a "voice" distinct from men).
60. See Shirley Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GoZDEN GATE
U L. Rv. 489 (1984) (making this claim);Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsidera-
tions of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 So. CAL. L. Ra. 1877 (1988) (same).
61. The available empirical data, however, does not provide strong support for this
view. See Beiner, supra note 11, at 599-603; Elaine Martin, Women on the Bench:A Different
Voice?, 77 JUDICATURE 126 (1993). But see Linda S. Maule, A Different Voice: The Feminine
Jurisprudence of the Minnesota Supreme Court, 9 BUFF.WOMEN'S UJ. 295 (2000/01) (analyzing
decisions of Minnesota Supreme Court, which after 1991 was the first state high court
with a majority of women).
62. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 72 VA. L. Rv. 543 (1986).
63. See ROBERT W. VAN SICKEL, NOT A PARTIcuLARLY DIFFERENT VOICE: THE JURIS-
PRUDENCE or SANmRA DAY O'CONNOR (1998).
64. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.YU. L. REv. 1546, 1557-58
(1991).
65. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (opinion coauthored by
Justice O'Connor).
66. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74,87 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).Justice
Ginsburg joined the dissent. See id. at 74.
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vitality of these precedents will ensure that today's error remains an
aberration.6
7
As an attorney, Justice Ginsburg advocated for women's rights and
argued six cases that raised gender issues before the Supreme Court. 8 As a
sitting Justice, she has continued her involvement with the National
Organization for Women. 69 It is difficult to see how her experiences could
not affect her views on legal issues in cases that touch on the rights of
women. For example, Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, with
Justice O'Connor joining, in United States v. Virginia,71 which invalidated
the policy of the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") that denied women
admission; she emphasized that "[t]here is no reason to believe that the
admission of women capable of all the activities required ofVMI cadets
would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to serve the
,more perfect Union "-71 One would suspect that, like these women,
members of other outsider groups would bring new voices to the judici-
ary. Racial minorities, however, remain underrepresented as judges.
3. Latina/o Voices
Latina/os, as well as African Americans and other racial minorities,
may be expected in the aggregate to have distinctive experiences that
might affect their approaches to particular legal issues. Immigration and
language regulation are two areas about which Latina/os as a group may
be expected to hold different views from Whites and African Americans
because the Latina/o experience with these areas of law are unique in
certain respects. 2 These two issues have a distinct and, at times, significant
67. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). By questioning Congress's judgment regarding a
provision of the immigration laws discriminating on the basis of gender, Justice O'Connor
implicitly contested the vitality of the plenary power doctrine, which traditionally has
immunized Congress's judgments on the substantive admission requirements for immi-
grants from judicial review. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 151-81 (2002)
(criticizing the plenary power doctrine); GERALD L. NEtUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CoNsri-
TuTION: IMMiGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw (1996) (same); Gabriel J. Chin,
Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46
UCLA L. Riv. 1 (1998) (same).
68. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 532-33 (Clare
Cushman ed., 1995).
69. Justice Ginsburg's involvement with this advocacy group has spawned contro-
versy. See Eric Fettman, Courting Hypocrisy-Scalia vs. Ginsburg, N.Y POST, Mar. 17, 2004, at
31.
70. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
71. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
72. See infta text accompanying notes 77-79 and 87.
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impact on the lives of Latina/os in the United States in a way that they do
not on other racial groups.
More generally, Latina/o civil rights issues and concerns are most
likely to be appreciated by a Latina/o. For example, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponc 3 approved the reliance on "Mexican appear-
ance" in immigration enforcement and stated that it may be employed
with other factors to justify the questioning of a person about his or her
immigration status." This holding seems incredible to most persons of
Mexican ancestry, who appreciate that there is no readily definable
"Mexican appearance." 75
The Court in Brignoni-Ponce simply failed to recognize that persons
of Mexican ancestry run the gamut of physically diverse appearances. Its
decision reflects a missing perspective, lack of information, and misunder-
standing of the Mexican American and Mexican immigrant communities
in the United States that a Latina/o would be less likely to overlook.76
As suggested by the Court's reasoning in Brignoni-Ponce, Latina/os in
the United States, regardless of their immigration and citizenship status,
often are stereotyped as "foreigners.."77 Such stereotyping has led to certain
forms of discrimination, such as being subjected to a greater likelihood of
immigration stops. 5 A noteworthy example of the foreigner stereotype at
73. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
74. Id. at 886-87. For criticism of this decision as well as racial profiling generally in
immigration enforcement, see Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immi-
gration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000). In Brignoni-Ponce, the Border Patrol
relied exclusively on the "Mexican appearance" of passengers in a motor vehicle to make
an immigration stop; although finding that an exclusive reliance on appearance violated
the Fourth Amendment, the Court stated that Border Patrol officers may consider "Mexi-
can appearance" in combination with other factors when making an immigration stop. See
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-87.
75. See Kevin R.Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and the Mexi-
can-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1259, 1291-93 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson,
Melting Pot] ("Most [persons of Mexican ancestry, for example,] are of dark complexion
with black hair .... But many are blond, blue-eyed and '[W]hite" while others have red
hair and hazel eyes.") (quoting JuLIAN., SAMORA & PATmCIA VANDEL SIMON, A HisTORY OF
THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN PEOPLE 8 (rev. ed. 1993)).
76. See Johnson, On the Appointment, supra note 18, at 7-11.
77. See Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2
HAav. LATINO L. Rav. 101, 117-29 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson, Some Thoughts]. Asian
Americans suffer from similar stereotypes. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, "Foreign-ness" & Asian
American Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4
AsiAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (1996); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship,
"Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REv. 261 (1997).
78. See, e.g., Hodgers-Durgin v. De laVina, 199 F3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying
class certification in case of Hispanic motorists alleging racial profiling in immigration
enforcement); Mary Romero & Marwah Serag, Violation of Latino Civil Rights from INS
and Local Police's Use of Race, Culture, and Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in
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work is the treatment of Congressman Luis Gutierrez, who was told by a
Capitol Police officer to "go back where he came from" as he attempted
to enter his congressional office in Washington, D.C.79
As these examples suggest, stereotypes about Latina/os influence the
law in ways that often appear to be race-neutral."0 An awareness of the
stereotypes and their impacts in relegating Latina/o citizens to second
class citizenship might influence a judge's approach to a variety of areas of
law, including the immigration and anti-discrimination laws.81
At the same time, Latina/os in certain instances share common cause
with other minorities. 2 For example, Latina/os, like African Americans,
often suffer as a result of the Supreme Court's requirement that a party
must prove a "discriminatory intent" in order to prevail on an Equal Pro-
tection claim;ss they have similar interests in contending that the
requirement is too onerous and that a racially disparate impact in certain
circumstances should be sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.8 4
For these and other reasons, some scholars have claimed that current
Equal Protection doctrine fails to adequately protect Latina/os. s Courts
often have been unable, or unwilling, to find that voter-backed initiatives
Arizona, 51 CLEv. ST. L. REv (forthcoming 2004) (analyzing treatment of Latina/os as pre-
sumptive foreigners in deportation operation in suburb of Phoenix,Arizona).
79. See Johnson, Some Thoughts, supra note 77, at 118-19 (recounting incident).
80. See generally SThEVN W BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOs, LAWS, AND
THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2003) (analyzing Latina/o stereotypes and their impacts).
81. This is not necessarily the case, however. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Ffiteenth
Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L.
REv. 1181 (1997) (reviewing LouiSE ANN FIscH, ALL RISE: REYNOrDo G. GARZA, THE
FIRST MEXICAN AMERICAN JUDGE (1996)) (suggesting that Judge Garza was not particularly
sympathetic to claims of Latina/os, especially Latina/o immigrants).
82. See LANi GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002); ERIC K. YAMAoro, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST CrVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999); Adrien
Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building,
and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REv. 717 (2003). But c. Richard Delgado, Linking Arms:
Recent Books on Interracial Coalition as an Avenue of Social Reform, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 855,
856-57 (2003) (book review) (criticizing the "preoccupation with interracial coalition"
and suggesting that minority groups pursue independent agendas).
83. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
84. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995)
(criticizing the intent standard and offering an alternative test); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rv. 317
(1987) (same); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context,
79 N.YU. L. Rev. 803 (2004) (same).
85. See Eduardo Luna, How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Mexican/Mexican
Americans and Discrimination Against Them Invisible, 14 BERKELEY LA RAzA L.J. 225 (2003);
Juan F Perea, Buscando America: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos,
117 HARv. L. R-Ev. 1420 (2004).
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that discriminate based on immigration status and language proficiency
violate the Constitution, even when the evidence strongly suggests that
racial animus toward Latina/os largely motivated passage of the laws. 6
Many Latina/os also view English language regulation, bilingual
education, and other issues differently than many Anglos .8 As the contro-
versy on the issue in states demonstrates, a driver's license is an important
civil rights issue to undocumented immigrants, a group that includes
many of Mexican origin.88 For this reason, Latina/o advocacy groups have
pressed for legislation in various states that would permit undocumented
immigrants to be eligible for driver's licenses.89 However, driver's license
eligibility is not generally a pressing issue for most Anglos, or United
States citizens of any racial background, and would not at first glance ap-
pear to be a significant civil rights issue.
Similarly, consider the views about the rights of United States citi-
zens living in Puerto Rico. Federal court of appeals Judge Juan Torruella,
who is of Puerto Rican ancestry, has written on the legal status of United
States citizens who live on the island of Puerto Rico, a United States ter-
ritory. His account and criticism of the unequal treatment of Puerto
Ricans differs substantially from that embraced by the United States Su-
preme Court," which has been willing to seriously curtail the legal rights
of United States citizens living in Puerto Rico.91 Not surprisingly,
Latina/os have written the bulk of the legal scholarship on the status of
86. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L.
Rav. 629 (1995) (analyzing racial animus underlying California's Proposition 187, an anti-
immigrant initiative); Kevin R.Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy:The
Case of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAviS L. Rv. 1227
(2000) (analyzing racial animus that motivated voter passage of California law ending bi-
lingual education in public schools).
87. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garda Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as a Product of
Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. Rav. 1347, 1364-67
(1997); Johnson & Martinez, supra note 86; Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as Status
Conflict, 75 CAL. L. R-Ev. 321 (1987).
88. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in the 21st Century: A Case
Study--Driver's Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants, 5 NE. L.J. 213 (2004) [hereinafter
Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights]; Maria Pabon L6pez, More Than a License to Drive:
State Efforts to Regulate Immigration Through Driver's Licenses, S. ILL. U. L.J. (forthcoming
2005).
89. SeeJohnson, Immigration and Civil Rights, supra note 88, at 215.
90. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F3d 80, 85 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torru-
ella,J., concurring);JuANToRRUELLA, PuERTo Rico AND THE CONSTITUTION:THE DOCTRINE
or SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985); see also Jos6 A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American
Empire, 127 U. PA. L. Rav. 391 (1978) (offering analysis of prominent Puerto Rican court
of appeals judge on treatment of Puerto Ricans).
91. See, e.g., DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1,200 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 287 (1901).
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Puerto Ricans in the United States,92 showing the particular interest in
this topic by Latina/os.
Latina/os also may, in the aggregate, have distinct views on criminal
justice questions." For example, they may be more attuned to the racial
profiling of Latina/os and how it operates in both ordinary criminal law
enforcement and immigration enforcement. 94 Cruz Reynoso, a former
Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court, has written about the
disparate impact of the criminal justice system on Latina/os.9 In addition,
not long after being sworn in as a court of appeals judge, Richard Paez
wrote an opinion invalidating California's "three strikes" law in a case in-
volving a Latina/o defendant. 6 It hardly seems a coincidence that a
Latino judge invalidated a law having a disparate impact on Latina/os in a
case involving a Latina/o defendant.
As Justice Marshall's presence on the Supreme Court affected delib-
erations and the views of other justices, Latina/o judges on the appellate
courts might well have similar impacts.
B. Does a Minority Voice Amount tojudicial Bias?
The "voices of color" perspective adds much-needed theoretical
support to the argument for judicial diversity. The perspectives of minor-
ity judges, however, raise the possibility of bias in the eyes of some
litigants. In refusing to disqualify himself because of his race from an em-
ployment discrimination case, Judge Higginbotham rejected the claim
that he was biased because he was African American and emphasized that:
I concede that I am [the B]lack. I do not apologize for that
obvious fact. I take rational pride in my heritage, just as most
92. See, e.g., PEDRO MALAVET, AMERICA'S COLONY: ThE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO Rico (2004); Sylvia R. LazosVargas,
History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit Theory: The Case of Racial Transformations Circa the Span-
ish American War, 1896-1900,78 DENy. U. L. REv. 921 (2001); Ediberto Romin & Theron
Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjugation Under United States Eipansion-
ism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 437 (2002).
93. See, e.g., Alfredo Mirand6, Is There a "Mexican Exception" to the Fourth Amend-
ment?, 55 FLA. L. PEv. 365 (2003); Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal
Construction of Latino Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENY. U. L. REV.
1081 (2001).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
95. See Cruz Reynoso, Hispanics and the Criminal Justice System, in HisPANIcS IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN AGENDA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 277 (Pastora San Juan Caf-
ferty & David W Engstrom eds., 2000) (analyzing overrepresentation of Latina/os in all
facets of the criminal justice system).
96. See Andrade v. Attorney General, 270 F3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub nom.,
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
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other ethnics take pride in theirs. However, that one is [B]lack
does not mean ... that he is anti-[W]hite.... As do most
[B]lacks, I believe that the corridors of history in this country
have been lined with countless instances of racial injustice....
Thus, a threshold question which might be inferred from de-
fendants' petition is: Since [B]lacks (like most other thoughtful
Americans) are aware of the "sordid chapter in American his-
tory" of racial injustice, shouldn't [B]lack judges be disqualified
per se from adjudicating cases involving cases of racial dis-
crimination?97
Judge Higginbotham answered the question whether his race per se
made him biased with an emphatic "no." Other minority judges have
faced similar disqualification pressures and have refused to acquiesce." We
are not aware of disqualification claims made against White judges based
on racial bias resting solely on their race.
The claim that minority judges are biased because of their race goes
to the heart of the judicial function. Above all else, judges must not be
biased but must remain impartial. Similarly, we value diversity on juries,
but impermissible bias will disqualify someone from jury service even if
she would contribute a diverse perspective.99 By demanding that juries are
drawn from a cross-section of the community and that jurors cannot be
barred from service based on race alone, courts have implicitly rejected
the notion that a juror presumably is biased solely because of his or her
racial identity?°° In Holland v. Illinois,"' the Supreme Court found that a
party could not exercise a peremptory challenge to strike an African
American juror based on the assumption that she would be presumptively
partial toward African Americans. °2 The same must hold true for the judi-
ciary. We address this critique in further detail in the next part. We also
discuss two distinct and important impacts of judicial diversity: improved
decision-making in multimember bodies and improved judicial legiti-
macy.
97. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F Supp.
155, 163-65 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (footnotes omitted); see Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judid-
ary, 20 YAL L. & POL'Y Rav. 325 (2002) (analyzing Judge Higginbotham's decision in this
case).
98. See MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 E3d 33 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Asian American judge Denny Chin), cert. denied, In re Klayman, 525 U.S. 874 (1998);
Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y 1975) (African American judge
Constance Baker Motley).
99. See infa text accompanying note 168.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 159-60.
101. 493 U.S. 474 (1990),
102. See id. at 484 n.2.
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II. BENEFITS OF RAcIAL DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH
Although the appointment of a racially diverse judiciary is fre-
quently extolled as a virtue, little attention has been paid to its concrete
benefits. Such diversity is not only important symbolically; a more diverse
bench will enrich the decision-making process of multimember courts. A
diverse judiciary also holds greater legitimacy with the public than a ho-
mogeneous one. Finally, a racially diverse bench would further the goal of
judicial impartiality.
A. Improved Decision-Making on Multimember Courts
Diversifying the judiciary will improve judicial decision-making by
including different perspectives in the process. As Professor Sherrilyn Ifill
observed:
[T]he most important benefit of judicial diversity is its poten-
tial to improve judicial decision-making. First, the creation of a
racially diverse bench can introduce traditionally excluded per-
spectives and values into judicial decision-making. The
interplay of diverse views and perspectives can enrich judicial
decision-making. Because they can bring important and tradi-
tionally excluded perspectives to the bench, minority judges
can play a key role in giving legitimacy to the narratives and
values of racial minorities. 3
Today, the lack of diversity on the courts limits the variety of per-
spectives in judicial decision-making and limits the input into the judicial
function. As previously discussed, one can imagine that different racial
groups, in the aggregate, may have different collective views. For example,
many racial minorities unfortunately have first hand experience with per-
ceived racial profiling in traffic stops.' 4 In addition, African Americans and
Latina/os are disparately represented in the criminal justice system, espe-
cially in the nation's prisons. This overrepresentation no doubt contributes
to these groups' distrust of law enforcement and general cynicism about
103. Ifill, Beyond Role Models, supra note 10, at 409-10 (footnotes omitted).
104. See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment:A Cultural Study of
the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REv. 851 (2002); Angela J. Davis, Race,
Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425 (1997); David A. Harris, The Stories, the
Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 275-88
(1999); Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving Wile Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Con-
sequences, 40 B.C. L. REv. 717 (1999).
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the criminal justice system, something reflected in the racially divergent
opinions about the O.J. Simpson case on its ten year anniversary."'
Concrete examples of missing perspectives are easy to find in
Supreme Court decisions."6 In recent decisions, the Court has afforded
great deference to federal law enforcement authorities in allowing them
to stop and search automobiles even though such discretion is generally
understood by minorities to contribute to racial discrimination in law
enforcement.10 In United States v. Flores-Montano,"" for example, the Court
upheld the stop and search of a fuel tank of an automobile at the
international border with Mexico."H In a concurring opinion, Justice
Stephen Breyer stated that "Customs keeps track of the border searches its
agents conduct, including the reasons for the searches.... This
administrative process should help minimize concerns that gas tank
searches might be undertaken in an abusive manner." '
Justice Breyer's assumption that abusive searches at the border are
unlikely was probably shared by other Justices who also rejected the La-
tino defendant's Fourth Amendment claim. However, anyone experienced
with border enforcement, especially Latina/os who have been subject to
lawless conduct at the United States-Mexico border for generations, " '
would not be nearly as confident as Justice Breyer in the ability of self-
monitoring to keep the border enforcement officers honest. Stories of
abuse of persons at the border by law enforcement officers have been
well-documented, yet such abuses continue unabated." 2 Lawless conduct
has hardly been kept in check by self-regulation.
105. See Clarence Page, Our Great Racial Divide, CHI. TRk., June 13, 2004, at CII
(stating that a poll conducted on the tenth anniversary of the Simpson case showed that
"today 87 percent of [W]hites and only 29 percent of [B]lacks think O.J. Simpson is
guilty").
106. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76 (discussing the example of United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce).
107. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004); United States v. Ar-
vizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
108. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
109. Id.
110. Id. (BreyerJ., concurring) (citation omitted).
111. See generally ALFREDO MmrArND, GRINGO JUSTICE (1987) (documenting history of
abuse of persons of Mexican-American ancestry by Border Patrol).
112. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS
IN THE BORDER REGION WITH MEXICO (1998); see also AM. FRIENDS SERV. Comm., HUMAN
AND CIvIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ON THE U.S. MEXICO BORDER 1995-97 (1998). Border
operations implemented in the early 1990s have had deadly impacts, with thousands of
immigrants dying as they attempted to journey to the United States across deserts and
mountains. See, e.g.,Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Conse-
quences of US Immigration Control Policy, 1993-2000, 27 POPULATION & DEv. RE. 661
(2001); Karl Eschbach et al., Death at the Border, 33 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 430 (1999); Bill
Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 121
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More generally, the extension of greater discretion to law enforce-
ment by the Supreme Court threatens to make things worse, not better,
for racial minorities. 3 Police likely will rely more on unconscious dis-
crimination when given greater discretion than with less.' Racial
minorities already suffer from the vast, unchecked discretion afforded law
enforcement and prosecutors in the criminal justice system, with the
greater discretion arguably contributing to the racially disparate results of
that system.'
As this discussion suggests, a racially diverse group of judges might
be expected to bring a variety of different perspectives to the judiciary
based on their personal experiences." 6 As Justice Lewis Powell observed,
"a member of a previously excluded group can bring insights to the
Court that the rest of its members lack" 7 In this way, the benefits of di-
versity among judges resemble those that the Supreme Court accepted as
justifying affirmative action in higher education. In Grutter v. Bollinger,"'
the Court found that the University of Michigan Law School's race-
conscious affirmative action program, which was designed to ensure that a
"critical mass" of racial minorities attended the law school and contrib-
uted to a diversity of opinions, passed constitutional muster." 9 As racial
diversity improves the education for all students in a university, a diverse
judiciary generally improves the decision-making process. Judges interact
with one another, which may affect their views of particular cases or,
more generally, entire bodies of law. Give-and-take in arguments and de-
liberations generally sharpens the analysis and affects the final outcome.
These observations are especially true for multimember decision-
making bodies, such as appeals courts. The mere presence of a minority in
(2001).The ongoing tragedy is difficult to fathom, with the personal accounts of the death
and despair nothing less than heart wrenching. See, e.g., KEN ELLINGWOOD, HARD LINE:
LIFE AND DEATH ON THE U.S.-MExico BORDER (2004); Luis ALBERTO URREA, THE DEvIL'S
HIGHWAY: A TRuE STORY (2004).
113. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Wayne A. Logan, Street
Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 IND. LJ. 419 (2002).
114. See Lawrence, supra note 84, at 343-44.
115. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDIIAM L. REv. 13 (1998);Tracey Maclin,Terry v. Ohio' Fourth Anendment Legacy: Black
Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271 (1998).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
117. PERRY, supra note 14, at 137; see O'Connor, supra note 32, at 1217 (asserting that
"[a]lthough all of us come to the Court with our own personal histories and experiences,
Justice Marshall brought a special perspective to the Court" that he offered to his brethren
during conference, oral arguments, meetings, and the like); see also Goldman, supra note 11,
at 205 ("[TIhe participation of women and minorities on the bench may add a dimension
of justice to the courts."); cf Brest, supra note 11, at 667 ("[T]he Court sometimes has
exhibited a striking insensitivity and indifference to the poor.").
118. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
119. See id. at 325-33.
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the deliberations over a case can dramatically change the dynamics of the
discussion. One minority jurist sitting on a panel in civil rights case can
change the tenor of the discussion by challenging stereotypes, limiting
improper discussion, and adding important information. In this regard, it
is particularly appropriate to consider the impact of Justice Marshall on
the Supreme Court and how he, by all accounts, contributed invaluably to
the Court's decision-making process. 2 Other Justices on the Court cred-
ited him with adding much to the Court's deliberations due to his
experiences as an African American civil rights activist in the days of great
upheaval and enduring change to the social fabric of the United States.12
Importantly, a racial minority may moderate anti-minority views
and offer thoughts and perspectives not provided by other judges. As the
presence of a woman will tend to chill inappropriate gender-related
comments in social conversation, the same tends to be true of inappropri-
ate race-related comments. The presence of a minority judge can thus be
expected to reduce bias toward minorities in the deliberations of the
court and to change the entire tone and nature of the discussion. This, in
turn, night well influence the ultimate outcomes of cases.
As discussed, however, minorities are not all alike. For example, a
minority need not necessarily speak with a particular minority voice.122
Individual characteristics as well as group membership shape a person, and
the qualities of the person will affect his or her impact on fellow judges.
As Sylvia Lazos Vargas contends, even though an African American sits on
the Supreme Court, no current Justice on the Court pushes the other
Justices "to go beyond simplistic understandings of race relations."123 This
is a significant weakness because the Court regularly confronts difficult
cases dealing with issues of race and civil rights, such as the recent af-
firmative action and cross burning cases."' Although increased diversity
on the Court would not necessarily remedy the absence of a sophisticated
understanding of race, over time a "critical mass" of minority group
members serving on the bench would be more likely to transform the
Court toward a more sophisticated understanding of race and racism in
the United States.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
121. See Johnson, On the Appointment, supra note 18, at 3-7.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 38-52.
123. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That Is Inclu-
sive?:What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MIcu.J. RACE &
L. 101 (2004).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
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B. Enhanced Legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
By making an important decision-making institution more repre-
sentative of the greater community, a diverse judiciary fosters the
legitimacy of the courts among the public. Such legitimacy enhances
public compliance with court rulings. As Justice Frankfurter remarked in
his powerful dissent in Baker v. Carr2 in reaction to what he perceived as
a grave threat to the Court's legitimacy: "The Court's authority-
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by
the Court's complete detachment ... from political entanglements and by
abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political
settlements." '126 Similar concerns influenced the Supreme Court's decision
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 ' which refused to retreat from protecting a
woman's reproductive freedom, and Justice Stevens' dissent in Bush v.
Gore,1 s which condemned the Court's apparent lack of impartiality in
effectively naming the new President.
The concept of judicial legitimacy plays a crucial role in the public's
understanding, appreciation, and acceptance of our judicial system. In or-
der for the public to accept court rulings as binding, the judiciary must be
seen as a legitimate institution; there must be public confidence in the
courts and their work.12 Such confidence can be roughly gauged by pub-
lic support for the Supreme Court.3
125. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional
Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
127. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the
Empowerment of Discretionary LegalAuthority, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994).
128. 531 U.S. 98, 123, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential
election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law."); see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME
INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, at 5-6 (2001) ("[Tlhere is
... widespread popular outrage at what the high [Clourt did.... [And when the Court
members] act in an unprincipled and partisan manner---as they did in Bush v. Gore-they
risk losing respect and frittering away the moral capital accumulated by their predecessors
over generations.").
129. See ABA PEPORT OF TIIE COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARYJUSTICE
IN JEOPARDY 10-11 (2003) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest
Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325,
1383 (1987).
130. See STEVEN J. RoSENSTONE ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY, 1997:
PILOT STUDY [computer file] (2nd ICPSR release. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan,
Center for Political Studies [producer], 1999.Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1999).
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Pushed to its logical end, judicial legitimacy ultimately ensures pub-
lic compliance with judicial decisions regardless of public agreement with
the specific rulings in question."' If the public does not consider the
courts to be legitimate institutions, voluntary compliance with judicial
decisions will be more difficult to secure. Massive resistance to the deseg-
regation efforts triggered by Brown v. Board of Education'32 is perhaps the
most famous example. For that reason, branding a particular court a "kan-
garoo court" labels it an illegitimate court, one whose rulings do not
warrant respect, legitimacy, and adherence.
Racial diversity on the judiciary contributes to judicial legitimacy.
In order for this argument to make sense, it requires a belief in courts as
having large degrees of discretion to decide cases. It further requires a be-
lief that a "voice of color" in fact exists and must be represented in the
judiciary.We previously pushed the latter claim.'33 As to the former, a view
of courts as policy-making institutions driven by the ideologies of their
members finds much support in the social sciences, where the debate over
the attitudinal model rages on.'
131. See RICHARD M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE: SUPREME COURT
DECiSION-MAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE 143, 149 (1967) (explaining that the Court
engenders the impression of "majestic fairness, reasonableness, and expertness" and that
this impression is crucial, for it may lead to compliance with Court rulings even if in dis-
agreement with them); David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme
Court, 1973 Wis. L. Rv. 790, 802 (1973) (defining the legitimacy-conferring power of the
Court as "creat[ing] acceptance of policy among those who oppose or are neutral about its
substance and heighten acceptance among those already committed to its content"),James
L. Gibson, Understandings ofJustice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Toler-
ance, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 469, 472 (1989) (explaining that judicial legitimacy asks
whether citizens are "likely to comply with [the Court's] decisions even when they are
unpopular").
132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally NuMANV BARTEY, THE RISE OF MAssivE RE-
SISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969) (analyzing
resistance to school desegregation after Brown).
133. See supra Part I.A.
134. The attitudinal model contends that judges, and Supreme Court Justices in par-
ticular, decide cases in accordance with their ideological preferences. On this view, "the
Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the cases vis-i-vis the ideological
attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because
he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is extremely lib-
eral." JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REViSITED (2002); see Frank B. Gross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism:A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251 (1998); see also John E.
Nowak, The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 345, 471 (1995) ("The Supreme Court's history indicates that legal theories are of far
less importance than the political affiliation of the Justices of the Court in determining the
outcome of the Supreme Court decisions concerning racial minorities"). Some scholars take
this view fiirther and argue that judicial legitimacy in fact demands that courts behave as
policy-makers. See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 188 (1999)
(concluding that "continued legitimacy demands that the Court be policy motivated, and
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It is for these reasons that racial diversity enhances the legitimacy of
our courts. Legitimacy is a special concern when focused on groups that
traditionally have been shut out of the justice system. Why would racial
minorities respect rulings from institutions that fail to represent them? In
the eyes of the unrepresented, such courts are by definition illegitimate.'3 s
Even if one agrees that most minority judges decide cases like their
brethren,'36 one may nonetheless support a racially diverse judiciary to
provide judicial legitimacy.'37 Efforts to diversify the bench must be un-
derstood along these lines, with the bottom line being that outsider
groups may not consider a homogeneous bench to be legitimate.
C. Impartiality as the Sine Qua Non of the Judicial Craft
Above all, a judge must be impartial. Critics of judicial diversity
might argue that the demand for judicial diversity compromises the
demand for judicial impartiality.'38 After all, why does diversity on the
bench matter ifjudges of color will not be "biased" toward their commu-
nities?'39
We contend that calls for diversity on the judiciary neither com-
promise nor endanger judicial impartiality.The emphasis on impartiality is
grounded in the belief that judges must not pre-judge controversies." Yet
thus, politically sensitive and responsible in the exercise of its power"); see also Thomas W
Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17 H~av. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 137, 138-39
(1994) ("The legitimacy of the Court would in fact be enhanced rather than diminished if
the Court renounced the idea that its decisions are compelled by law, and instead openly
acknowledged that it exercises political discretion.').
135. See ABA RIPoir, supra note 129, at I ("Within communities of color ... suspi-
cion of the courts is compounded by a lack of diversity throughout the judicial system.");
cf PEaY, supra note 14, at 135 (contending that the Court gains public acceptance by not
being of a "single image" or a "single mold") (quoting from a personal interview with
Justice O'Connor).
136. See Thomas G.Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 614 (1985) (concluding that President Carter's
unprecedented appointment of women and people of color to the federal bench had little
impact, as they find little evidence that "nontraditional judges have assumed a strong advo-
cacy role on behalf of any racial or gender-based interests"). Of course, a well-known
exception to this view is found in the career ofJustice Thurgood Marshall.When it came to
civil rights issuesJustice Marshall may be considered to have represented African Americans
during his career as a Justice. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33 (discussing impact of
Justice Marshall on the Court).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 125-35.
138. See supra Part I.B.
139. For a discussion of similar issues of bias, see Resnik, supra note 60, at 1923-28.
Interestingly, most Whites, however, do not see White jurists as serving White interests and
thus do not seem much concerned with this possibility.
140. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,776-77 (2002).
[VOL. 10:5
Racial Diversity on the Judiciary
arguments for judicial diversity do not hinge on such an understanding of
what judges do on the bench. Rather we do understand judges as policy-
makers with some degree of discretion, taking positions and deciding
cases in accordance with their ideological preferences. In this vein, Criti-
cal Race Theorists have made a convincing case for the role played by
race in the lawmaking process, with personal values and racial sensibilities
coming into play."' Increased diversity does not mean appointing judges
who have predetermined positions but instead judges who have different
ways of looking at the world.
1 2
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,143 the Court rejected the
view of impartiality as a "lack of preconception in favor of or against a
particular legal view."'14 This understanding of impartiality "has never been
thought a necessary component of equal justice,"'45 the Court continued,
and obviously so. After all, judges will have preconceived ideas about the
law before assuming their positions on the bench, and, besides, it would
hardly be desirable if they did not. "Proof that a Justice's mind at the time
he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitu-
tional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of
bias."'46
We agree with the Supreme Court that judges will have judicial
preconceptions upon assuming their positions on the bench. It is precisely
with this understanding that our arguments for judicial diversity make any
sense. Because judges' ideas and views about the world and the law will
affect how they rule in particular cases, a diverse judiciary is necessary to
ensure that the interests of many groups are factored into judicial
decision-making.
The recent electoral redistricting cases offer a classic example of this
view. In Shaw v. Reno,147 Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that ir-
regularly-shaped majority minority districts reinforce "the perception that
members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education,
141. See, e.g., GnARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT
AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 116-22; see also Deseriee A. Kennedy, Judicial
Review and Diversity, 71 TENN. L. REV. 287 (2004) (contending that diversity on the judici-
ary is necessary for judicial review). Public opinion research supports this view. See, e.g.,
DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: R.ACIAL POLITICS AND DE-
MOCRATIC IDEALS (1996).
143. 536 US. 765 (2002).
144. Id. at 777. In this case, the Court invalidated on First Amendment grounds a
Minnesota judicial conduct standard that limited what a candidate might state publicly
about his or her views in a judicial election.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 778 (citing Laird v.Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum opin-
ion)).
147. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidate at the polls.
We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial
stereotypes"' 4 The Court worried about the messages these districts send
to elected representatives: "When a district obviously is created solely to
effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected
officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to rep-
resent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a
whole."1 49 The injuries described by Justice O'Connor have been charac-
terized as "expressive harms.""'
And yet, we know that the state of the world is not quite as idyllic as
the Court posits. To be sure, the perceptions about which the Court
speaks were true for many people in North Carolina in 1993 and might
still be true for most Americans today. The Court contends that racially
gerrymandered districts exacerbate the problems that already exist. How-
ever, one might instead sensibly conclude that irregularly-shaped majority
minority districts are necessary in order to combat generations of racial
discrimination in voting, as well as the realities of racial bloc voting."'
Translating social and demographic facts into judicial doctrines
places grave demands on judges. We do not impugn Justice O'Connor
and her motives; we instead place the facts in the redistricting cases in a
different historical context than she does. Although she may not be partial
to some individual litigants over others, she necessarily adheres to her
own understandings of the world. In the districting plan in North Caro-
lina, for example, she sees racial balkanization where we see the promise
of minority inclusion and integration. ' In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC'" and City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co.,' 4 both of which involved
the consideration of race in the award of public contracts, she sees racial
spoils where we see the kind of interest group politics to which the
148. Id. at 647.
149. Id. at 648.
150. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH. L.
REv. 483, 506 (1993); see also Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 310-12 & nn.58-59 (2003) (explaining the expressive nature of law
and citing leading authorities).
151. See Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HAv..L. REV.
109 (1994).
152. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights
Trilogy, 1993 Sup. CT. R. 245, 282 ("To say that either district even remotely resembles
'political apartheid'-especially given that House District 2, where a majority of the Shaw
plaintiffs lived, was a nearly perfect mirror of the state's overall racial makeup-would be
risible if it were not so pernicious.") (footnotes omitted).
153. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
154. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (O'Connor,J.).
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Court has traditionally deferred."' 5 Although Justice O'Connor fears ex-
pressive harms from the consideration of race in these instances, we
appreciate the expressive benefits in the federal government's efforts to
eradicate the scourge of racial discrimination from American social life.
Judicial selection methods must ensure that a broad range of voices
are represented on the bench to improve judicial impartiality. The back-
grounds, perceptions, and understandings of the world serve as powerful
social filters of judges that matter a great deal to the judicial function.
Thus, in order for our independent judiciary to truly be "one of the
crown jewels of our system of government, ' 1 6 it must be racially diverse.
III. LESSONS FROM JURIES
Juries are fundamental to the conception of democracy in the
United States. To this point, the analysis of the benefits of racial diversity
has been largely divorced from the study of a diverse judiciary. However,
the arguments for diverse juries offer insights for those contending that
the quest for a racially diverse judiciary is both important and legitimate.
As a democratic institution, juries in the United States must be open to all
segments of the community to hold any degree of legitimacy among
judges, lawyers, and-perhaps most importantly-the public at large.
The nation's commitment to diversity in the jury pool offers impor-
tant lessons equally applicable to the judiciary. A cross-section approach to
juries looks to the inclusiveness of the jury pool and to the general un-
derstanding that any individual juror, even if she would add racial diversity
to the jury, must be stricken if her views are so extreme that she cannot
be expected to fairly decide a case. The same holds true for judges.
Eligibility qualifications for jurors and judges affect efforts at in-
creasing racial diversity. Limits on eligibility for jury service decrease the
representativeness of juries, just as informal requirements on judicial
nominees reduce the representation of minorities within the judiciary.
A. A Jury Drawn From a Fair Cross-Section of the Community
The generally accepted view in the United States is that juries
should be drawn from a cross-section of the community rather than
155. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 614 ("Like the vague assertion of societal discrimi-
nation, a claim of insufficiently diverse broadcasting viewpoints might be used to justify
equally unconstrained racial preferences, linked to nothing other than proportional repre-
sentation of various races."); Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 ("Absent such findings, there is a
danger that a racial classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form
of racial politics."); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971 (1990).
156. Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Joins Fray on Rulings, DefendingJudicial Independence,
N.Y.TDMEs,Apr. 10, 1996, at Al.
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exclusively from one portion of the community."7 This policy reflects the
view that a jury is a democratic institution"5 8 and that "representativeness
(1) improves the quality of jury decision-making; (2) enhances the jury's
political legitimacy as a democratically inclusive institution; and (3) serves
to educate jurors from the various represented groups about the nature
and importance of civic participation."1 9
The Supreme Court has extolled the virtues of drawing a jury from
a diverse cross-section of the community, stating that:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connec-
tion with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily
contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of
the community. ... This does not mean, of course, that every
jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social,
religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the com-
munity; frequently such complete representation would be
impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be se-
lected by court officials without systematic and intentional
exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be given
to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found
in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual
rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very
heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to
class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to
the democratic ideals of trial by jury. 60
157. See JoN M.VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMIT-
MENT TO R-EPRESENTATIVE PANELS 23-44 (1977); see also Andrew D. Leipold,
Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945,
949-75 (1998) (analyzing critically the requirement that the jury pool should represent a
cross-section of the community).
Federal law states that "[i]t is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Fed-
eral courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes." 28 U.S.C. 5 1861 (2000) (emphasis added).
158. See ALExiS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 252 (Jacob Peter Mayer &
Max Lerner eds., 1969) (discussing juries as part of the commitment of the United States
to democracy); VAN DYvK, supra note 157, at 1 ("The jury is the most democratic of our
institutions.").
159. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REv. 353, 361 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
160. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (citations omitted); see Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) ("The very idea of ajury is a body of men com-
posed of peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status
in society as that which he holds."). For discussions of the benefits of a diverse jury, see
Sandra D. Jordan, The Criminal Jury Trial: Erosion of Jury Power, 5 How. SCROLL: SOC. JUST.
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Although the methods of impaneling juries are designed to ensure
that each jury is drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, an
impaneled jury need not reflect every part of the community. No quotas
control the composition of juries; rather, litigants jockey over which ju-
rors will be impaneled.
The Supreme Court long ago held that racial minorities could not
be excluded from grand or petit juries.' In Smith v. Texas, the Court
forcefully explained that "[flor racial discrimination to result in the exclu-
sion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government."' 62
Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has limited the use of
peremptory challenges, which parties can ordinarily exercise to strike a
prospective juror for almost any reason.1 63 Neither racial minorities64 nor
women' 65 may be excluded from serving on a jury because of their race
or gender through the use of peremptory challenges.
Although the emphasis in jury exclusion cases is on the individual
rights of litigants and prospective jurors, claiming that group membership
is irrelevant to juries overstates matters. Group representation on juries is
important for minority litigants in their feelings of community
membership and their beliefs about the legitimacy of the justice system.'66
A prospective juror also has rights at stake, including the right to
participate in what effectively is a political decision-making body. 7 In
this way, jury service implicates both group and individual rights.
REv. 1, 29-37 (2002); Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
659 (2002).
161. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310; see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
For a general discussion of the representation of racial minorities on juries, see HIRosHI
FuKuRAi ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: R-AcIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR
JUSTICE (1993).
162. 311 U.S. 128,130 (1940).
163. See infa text accompanying notes 202-03.
164. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 1 (1990) (contending that Whites should not be allowed to use peremptory chal-
lenges to strike African American jurors because to do so would violate the Thirteenth
Amendment). For analysis of the possible abolition of peremptory challenges, see Nancy S.
Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1041
(1995).
165. SeeJ.E.B. v.Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
166. See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights,
50 STAN. L. R-ev. 915 (1998).
167. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 203 (1995).
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Despite the commitment to inclusiveness among juries, we, as a so-
ciety, are ambivalent about how truly representative we want juries to be.
Parties may exercise peremptory challenges--striking jurors without of-
fering a reason-and have the right to remove jurors for cause when their
views are strong enough to warrant a fear that they may not act impar-
tially." Jury control devices abound, such as the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which limit the evidence that a jury will see in a case, summary
judgment, judgment as a matter of law, and new trial motions.69 These
devices, among other things, allow the court to intervene when it con-
cludes that a jury exceeded its authority.Various jury control devices have
been criticized as anti-democratic, but their existence shows the ambiva-
lence about how closely we want our juries to resemble society.75
B. The Benefits: Better Decision-Making and
the Appearance of Impartiality
The basic idea behind the fair cross-section of the community re-
quirement is that such a system will provide for a variety of perspectives
to the jury's deliberations, helping to ensure better decision-making and
to enhance the appearance of impartiality. The generalized desire to draw
a jury from a cross-section of the community does not mean that any
particular juror will be seated. In summarizing a series ofjury studies, one
commentator states that "[j]ury research shows that racially heterogeneous
juries are more likely than single race juries to enhance the quality of de-
liberations. A number of empirical studies ... show that racially mixed
juries minimize the distorting risk of bias."' 7'
168. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974); see, e.g., Flowers v. Flowers, 397
S.W2d 121 (Tex.App. 1965).
169. See FED. R. Crv. P. 50, 56, 59; FED. R. EVID.
170. See Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available
Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961);Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush toJudgment:Are
the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichs Ending Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 982 (2003).
171. Hiroshi Fukurai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action injury Selec-
tion, 11 BEUO3EiY LA RAzA L.J. 17, 20 (1999) (footnotes omitted); see Eric L. Muller,
Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106
YALE L.J. 93, 97-107 (1996); see also Developments in the Law-Race in the Criminal Process,
101 HARv. L. Ra. 1472, 1557-88 (1988) (scrutinizing the impact of race on jury delibera-
tions); Sheri Lyn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1611 (1985)
(analyzing studies suggesting bias by White jurors in deciding cases with African American
criminal defendants).
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As with judges, the evidence is not clear, however, that the race of
jurors definitely affects the outcome of any particular case. '72 Acknowl-
edging this basic truthJustice Marshall nonetheless emphasized that:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the
jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human
experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps un-
knowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded
group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude ...
that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human
events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that
may be presented.173
Moreover, a diverse jury pool serves important public values.
Namely, society has an interest in protecting the legitimacy of the jury
system by impaneling a jury from a cross-section of the community.' 4 If
the jury reflects a mix of the community, the public will tend to view the
final outcome of a jury verdict as more legitimate because it more closely
approximates the community; in other words, the jury in that circum-
stance is more democratic. The idea is that the "best way to minimize bias
is to impanel a representative cross section of the community; without
such a cross section, doubts about the jury's partiality will persist."175
Along these lines, "[t]he representative character of a jury should
also enhance its capacity to reach a community consensus with respect to
normative, moral, or otherwise subjective judgments." '76 Regardless of the
outcome, the decision of a representative jury is more likely to be viewed
as legitimate than that of a homogeneous jury. 77
The need for legitimacy is at its greatest in a highly charged, poten-
tially racially-polarizing case. The all-White jury that acquits White police
172. Compare Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MIcH. L. Rnv. 63, 77-99 (1993) (reviewing evi-
dence of impact of juror's race on outcome) with Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane,
Constructing A Jury That is Both Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in
Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 705 (1998) (footnote omitted) (stating that "the im-
pact of race on jury verdicts cannot be established definitively").
173. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (footnote omitted) (holding that
White defendant could raise issue of exclusion of African Americans from the jury).
174. See Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence
in the Fairness ofJury Proceedings:An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CrIM. L. REv. 1177 (1994).
175. VAN DYKE, supra note 157, at 45.
176. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 159, at 362; see Albert W Alschuler, Racial Quotas and
theJury, 44 DUKE LJ. 704,717-23 (1995).
177. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 159, at 362-64; Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or
Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. Rv. 501,
504 (1986).
F~ALL 2004]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
officers who commit violence on an African American (Rodney King, for
example), is the archetypal case of this type. As one scholar notes:
[T]he perception that the composition of the jury affects its
verdict is the basis of challenges by defendants to the makeup
of juries that convicted them. The all-[W]hite jury trying a
[B]lack man, the all-male jury trying a woman, and the jury of
the propertied judging the case of a laborer, and the middle-
aged deciding the fate of a youth-all these have been chal-
lenged for not fulfilling the constitutional guarantee of an
"impartial jury."'
The public reaction to a diverse jury's conviction of a minority de-
fendant will differ substantially from the public perception of the criminal
conviction of an African American by an all-White jury. '79 Indeed, the
mere reference to an "all-White jury" amounts to a harsh rebuke of the
jury verdict, in large part because it taps into a notoriously ugly history of
racism in the criminal justice system in the United States."'t
Riots followed the all-White jury's acquittal of the Los Angeles po-
lice officers who were videotaped beating African American Rodney
King.' In essence, the African American community believed that the
jury did not represent the community as a whole, especially the commu-
nity primarily affected by the police brutality; that community saw the
jury's verdict as illegitimate.18 2 These deep-seated feelings contributed to
the violent uprisings that followed.
178. VAN DYKE, supra note 157, at 45.
179. See Alschuler, supra note 176, at 704 ("Few statements are more likely to evoke
disturbing images of American criminal justice than this one: 'The defendant was tried by
an all-[W]hite jury.'"); Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But is She a Soul
Sister? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.YU. L. REv. 327, 327-31
(1994) (offering examples of controversial verdicts rendered by all-White juries); James
Forman, Jr.,Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895 (2004) (stating that
one of the goals of the Reconstruction Amendments was "to protect[] [B]lack victims
from all-[W]hite juries").
180. See RIANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997); KATHERYN K. Rus-
SELL ET AL., RACE AND CRIME: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (2000).
181. See generally READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING (Robert Good-
ing-Williams ed., 1993). In the Rodney King case, the trial was moved from downtown
Los Angeles to Simi Valley, a White suburb, with a racially unrepresentative jury ultimately
hearing the case.
182. The lessons of the Rodney King violence have been grimly summarized as
follows:
Many lessons may be learned from the embers of burned homes and store-
fronts in South Central Los Angeles. Among the most important is that
America's failure to include minorities in judicial decisions that affect their
lives is a prescription for chaos ... The lesson is not new.Violent reactions to
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The legitimacy of the decision-making process thus is fostered by
ensuring that juries are diverse." 3 Currently, minorities see a court system
in the United States that is predominantly White, with White lawyers and
judges the norm.'84 "Nonwhites are underrepresented on juries in the vast
majority of courts in this country"'185 The decisions meted out by the jus-
tice system are viewed as having racially disparate impacts, with White
people dispensing and defining "justice" in cases involving people of
color.
Not long after the riots protesting the acquittal of police officers in
the Rodney King case in May of 1992, one prominent court of appeals
judge pointed to the Presidents' judicial selections and stated the follow-
ing about the federal courts: "[b]y their [judicial] appointments, Presidents
Reagan and Bush have ensured that the federal courts will not be repre-
sentative. Instead, they are a bastion of [W]hite America."' 6 This extreme
characterization aptly describes how many minorities may view the judi-
ciary and the justice system as a whole.
C. Anti-Democratic Tendencies: Limits on Juror Eligibility
Juries represent the nation's commitment to democracy in our jus-
tice system as well as a protection against the arbitrary use of judicial
power."' There are limits to the nation's commitment to a jury being
drawn from a cross-section of the community, with many of the exclu-
sions having racial impacts and adversely affecting the representative
nature of the jury. Various eligibility requirements deny segments of the
miscarriages of justice by [W]hite judges and all-[White juries are an all-
too-common signpost of American history.
Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race
Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 511, 516 (footnote omitted).
183.
The jury system is supposed to establish the legitimacy of the justice ren-
dered-to prevent such mistrust and hostility from occurring. But racially
connected misconceptions and prejudice can imperil the impartiality of a
jury Only by balancing this prejudice-which jurors of all kinds feel about
issues and people-through a jury composed of a cross-section of the com-
munity can impartiality be fostered.
VAN DYKE, supra note 157, at 32.
184. See Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas-Gendered in Jus-
tice/Gendered Injustice: Latinas, Fronteras and the Law, 1 J. GENDER, RACE, & jusT. 353, 373-75
(1998).
185. VAN DYKE, supra note 157, at 28.
186. Stephen R,. Reinhardt, Riots, Racism, and the Courts, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
1,7 (1993).
187. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657,664 (1874).
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community from anything close to proportionate representation on juries
and undermine their legitimacy.
Consider some of the limits on the representativeness ofjuries. So-
cioeconomic class differences contribute to lower representation on juries
by poor and working class people who are less able economically to per-
form jury service.'" Racial minorities are underrepresented in jury pools
and juries, prompting academics to propose corrective measures. 9 This
section analyzes eligibility requirements that-dilute the representation of
minority groups, particularly Latina/os, on juries.
1. Immigrants
Immigrants who are not United States citizens, even those who have
lawfully lived in the United States for many years, may not serve on ju-
ries." This requirement has significant impacts on the jury pools in major
cities with large immigrant populations, such as Los Angeles, New York
City, San Francisco, Chicago, and Miami. The impacts are not limited to
major urban centers, however. Large immigrant populations have emerged
in rural parts of the country as well, including areas in the South and
Midwest.'9
Given the demographics of the modern immigrant stream, the citi-
zenship requirement for jury service has disparate racial impacts. For
example, according to Census 2000, almost thirty percent of the Latina/os
in the United States are not United States citizens'92 and thus are ineligi-
ble for jury service. In Los Angeles County in the year 2000, more than
188. See Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement,
84 CAL. L. R-Ev. 101,103-04 n.18 (1996) (citing studies reaching this conclusion).
189. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary
Review ofAfirmative Action injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. PEv. 707,712-19 (1993); see Deb-
orah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L.
PEv. 957, 977-78 (1995).
190. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1865(b)(1) (2000) (providing that a person who "is not a citizen
of the United States" is not eligible for jury service). Courts have upheld this requirement
in the face of the claim that it denies a party the right to an impartial jury. See, e.g., United
States v.Toner, 728 E2d 115,129-30 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100,
1118 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977); Perkins v. Smith, 370 E Supp. 134
(D. Md. 1974), aff'd without op., 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
191. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights" As We Know It?: Immigration and
Civil Rights in the New Millenium, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1481, 1492-96 (2002) [hereinafter
Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights"] (discussing Mexican diaspora across the United States).
192. U.S. Census Bureau, Place of Birth by Citizenship Status (Hispanic or Latino), at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet?DDTable?_bm=y&geo-id+D&dsnamc+D&_lang+e
n&mtname (last visitedJuly 24, 2004).
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one-third of the residents were foreign born, most of whom are nonciti-
zens excluded from the jury pool.'93
"The vast majority of today's immigrants are people of color.' 9 4 The
exclusion of immigrants from juries thus has serious impacts on the repre-
sentativeness ofjuries and the extent to which they reflect a cross-section of
the community. However, the justice system that denies immigrants from
serving on juries still resolves their civil and criminal disputes. 9s
Until early in the twentieth century, noncitizens were permitted to
vote and serve on juries in many states. 96 Indeed, for centuries, in order
to ensure fairness to noncitizens, English law authorized juries de medietate
linguae--juries of half citizens and half noncitizens-in cases involving
noncitizens.97 Allowing noncitizens, though perhaps only those who have
lived in a jurisdiction for a certain length of time, to serve on juries would
make juries more representative of the community.
2. English Language Proficiency
Under federal law, to be eligible for jury service, a person must be
able to read, write, understand, and speak English.'98 Like citizenship re-
quirements, English language requirements for jury service have disparate
impacts on minority communities, particularly Latina/o and Asian immi-
grants. Many (although by no means all) Latina/os in the United States are
primarily Spanish speakers.'" English may not be the primary language for
193. See U.S. Census Bureau, Los Angeles County Quick Facts from the US. Census
Bureau, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2004).
194. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights," supra note 191, at 1505.
195. See Amnar & Brownstein, supra note 166, at 918 (contending that the right to a
jury trial, as well as the right to vote, has both group and individual rights dimensions that
involve minority representation).
Noncitizens generally can have their disputes resolved in federal, rather than state,
courts, the assumption being that federal courts, which have judges with life tenure, are
less likely to be biased against foreigners. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1993 & Supp. 2004). See
generally Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern
Justjfications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(1996) (analyzing reasons for alienage jurisdiction). However, noncitizens still cannot sit on
juries in federal court.
196. See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Sufflage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391,1397-1417 (1993); Gerald M.
Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MTIcH. L. REV. 1092,
1093-1100 (1977).
197. See Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de
Medietate Linguae:A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 BU. L. REv. 777 (1994).
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2), (3) (2000).
199. See Cameron, supra note 87, at 1364-67 (analyzing importance of Spanish lan-
guage to Latina/o identity).
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many Asian immigrants, as well as some Native Americans in areas of the
country where indigenous languages are the primary languages of signifi-
cant portions of the population.200
Language requirements tend to reduce the representation of certain
minority groups and restrict the degree to which the jury will be drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community. In modern
American society, language may serve as a proxy for race. "Given the huge
numbers of immigrants who enter this country from Asian and Latin
American countries whose citizens are not White and who in most cases
do not speak English, criticism of the inability to speak English coincides
neatly with race""2
An example amply illustrates the overlap between language and race.
In Hernandez v. New York,2"2 the prosecutor, claiming that the prospective
jurors might disregard official translations, used peremptory challenges to
strike bilingual Spanish speakers, thus striking Latina/o jurors in a
criminal case involving a Latino defendant. Despite the clear racial
impacts, the Supreme Court found reliance on the peremptories to strike
bilingual Spanish/English speakers to be a permissible race-neutral reason
for exercising the challenges.0 3
As the Court suggested, an English language requirement seems rea-
sonable at first glance. The difficulties of translation of testimony and
documents in different languages may appear unwieldy. However, if we
truly are committed to the democratic ideal of having the jury pool re-
flect a cross-section of the community, we should reevaluate whether
limiting juror eligibility to English speakers costs more than it benefits the
system as a whole. To this point, law- and policy-makers have not engaged
in this cost-benefit analysis but simply have reflexively embraced English
without considering the racial impacts of the English language require-
ment for jury service.
200. See Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words: Native Americans' Continuing Strug-
gle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHio ST. L.J. 901 (1999).
201. Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:Address-
ing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL.
L. RE. 863, 874 (1995).
202. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
203. For a sampling of criticism of Hernandez, see Marina Hsieh, "Language-
Qualifying"Juries to Exclude Bilingual Speakers, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 1181 (2001); Miguel A.
M~ndez, Hernandez: The Wrong Message at the Wrong Time, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y R.EV. 193
(1993);Juan E Perea, Hernandez v. NewYork: Courts, Prosecutors and the Fear of Spanish, 21
HOeSTA L. PEV. 1 (1992); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of
Ethnic Groups fom Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 761.
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3. Felons
By federal law, convicted felons whose civil rights have not been re-
stored and persons with felony charges pending are excluded from serving
on juries in federal courts.10 4 Given the racially disparate impacts of the op-
eration of the criminal justice system in the United States, 5 minority
groups are overrepresented among those excluded from serving on juries
based on felony convictions. For example, more than thirty percent of the
potentially eligible African American men in Florida and Alabama are de-
nied the right to serve on juries as well as the right to vote.0 6 Nationally,
"fourteen percent of African American men are ineligible to vote because
of criminal convictions. In seven states, one in four Black men is perma-
nently barred from voting because of their criminal records."2 7 In these
states, the percentage of Black men permanently barred from voting is
much greater than the percentage of Black men as a percentage of the
population.
Like African Americans, Latina/os are disparately affected by the dis-
enfranchisement of felons."' Overrepresented in the criminal justice system
compared to their proportion of the population, Latina/os can be expected
to be excluded from jury service in disproportionate numbers due to felony
disenfranchisement. This is clearly the case in states such as California, Ari-
zona, New York, Florida, and Texas, which have large Latina/o populations
and an even a larger percentage in prison.0 9 Far smaller percentages of
204. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000).
205. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); KENNEDY, supra note 180; Reynoso, supra note 95, at 277; Dorothy
E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities,
56 STAN. L. Rav. 1271 (2004).
206. See John 0. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a
Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. Ry. 1253, 1277-80 & nn.115-16 (2001); see also Develop-
ments in the Law--The Law of Prisons, 115 HAsv. L. Rav. 1838, 1945 (2002) ("Florida has
disqualified 31.2% of its [B]lack voting-age population-the second highest rate in the
nation [Alabama's rate was 31.5%]-on the basis of felony convictions.") (footnote omit-
ted). For discussions of the voting impacts on felon disenfranchisement, see Pamela S.
Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate Over Felon Disen-
firanchisement, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1147 (2004); Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A
Growing Collateral Consequence of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENTENCING R-PT. 248 (2000);
Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 85 (2004).
207. George P Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses
of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1900 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
208. See Reynoso, supra note 95, at 294.
209. See MARIsA J. DEMEO & STEVEN A. OCHOA, MEXIcAN AM. LEGAL DEE. & EDUC.
FUND, DIMINISHED VOTING POWER IN THE LATINO COMMUNITY: ThE IMPACT OF FELONY Dis-
ENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN TEN TARGETED STATES (Vibiana Andvade ed., 2003), available at
http://www.maldef.org/publications/pdf/FEB18-LatinoVotingtightsReport.pdf.
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Whites than African Americans or Latina/os are declared ineligible for jury
service by this rule.
The end results are racially skewed jury pools that tend to produce ju-
ries that are demographically different from the community at large. Such
juries deny litigants the right to a jury that reflects the richness of the
greater community and diminishes the legitimacy of the jury's verdict in
the eyes of certain segments of the general population.
D. Lessons for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary
Eligibility requirements for jurors significantly impact the racial
demographics of juries and reduce their representativeness. The lack of
diversity on juries, in turn, has negative effects on the perceived legiti-
macy of the justice system. Racial skews in the body of decision-makers
contribute to the perception of racially biased decisions. In certain in-
stances, the questionable legitimacy of the decision-maker contributes to
the potential for civil unrest."'
Democratic theory suggests the need for a diverse jury pool that
represents the community in meting out justice, and it should apply
equally to judges who make judicial decisions affecting society. As has
been observed:
One aspect of democratic theory bears on the representative-
ness of public officials, including judges. Should not jurists
reflect a cross-section of the American people? Should they
not mix freely with the community they serve? Perhaps both
of these aspects of representativeness are required in order for
judges to be in tune with the values of the community.211
As a general proposition, a jury should reflect a cross-section of the
community because that makes it more likely to reflect a range of com-
munity values. Similarly, judges who reflect the diversity of the
community are more likely in the aggregate to reflect a range of views in
that community.
In any individual instance, however, a racial minority may hold views
or have biases that would justify striking that person from a jury.12 Similarly,
210. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
211. Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P Lovrich, Jr., StateJudidal Recruitment, in THE
AMERICAN CoURTs: A CRITICAL AsSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 161,164 (citations omitted).
212. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 9A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2483 (2d ed. 1995); see, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304
(2000) (addressing issues raised in case in which district court erred in denying challenge
to juror for cause despite his admission that he would favor the prosecution in a criminal
case).
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with respect to any individual judicial nominee, an individual may ideo-
logically be so far out of the mainstream that those sympathetic to
diversifying the judiciary might well agree that the nominee should be re-
jected.
A solid representation of minorities on the bench generally would be
viewed as a fairer and more impartial system, as well as one that would
likely command more public confidence. "[S]tructural impartiality is real-
ized through the interaction of diverse viewpoints on the bench and the
resulting decreased opportunity for one perspective to consistently domi-
nate judicial decision-making. As such, racial diversity on the bench would
promote, rather than undermine, impartiality."213
Limits on juror eligibility are being scrutinized currently
because of their consequences on the racial composition of juries.
The impacts of informal eligibility requirements for judges, such as
previous judicial experience" 4  or graduation from an elite law
school,215 resemble formal limits on juror eligibility. Like limitations on
juror eligibility, they may be tied to conceptions of "merit" and decisions
about who is "qualified" to be a judge. The implicit requirements limit the
diversity of the judiciary and undermine the legitimacy of its decisions in
the eyes of the public. Consequently, as with juror qualifications, the
qualifications demanded of judges deserve consideration to determine
whether the benefits of these characteristics to the decision-making process
are outweighed by the costs to the diversity of the judiciary.21
IVToWARD A PRINCIPLED POSITION FOR SEEKING
DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH
From Chief Justice William Rehnquist' 17 to the American Bar Asso-
ciation,21 broad agreement exists that there is a pressing need for a diverse
judiciary.As the late ChiefJustice Warren Burger remarked:
213. Ifill,Judging the Judges, supra note 16, at 119.
214. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experiene and Its Consequences
for Career Diversity on the US. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REv. 903,956-60 (2003) (finding that
gender and racial diversity of pool of potential Supreme Court nominees was reduced sig-
nificantly by requirement that all nominees have previous judicial experience); Goldman,
supra note 11, at 198 (noting trend since Eisenhower administration of nominating federal
judges with previous judicial experience).
215. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 195 (stating that, in 1991, "[c]lose to 85 percent of
those appointed to the Supreme Court attended the best law schools or (as was typical of
legal education in the nineteenth century) served apprenticeships with prominent lawyers
and judges").
216. See supra text accompanying note 211.
217. ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that "'[a]ll things being equal,' the President might
indeed consider'representative factors" PERv, supra note 14, at 137 (quoting Rehnquist).
218. See ABA REPORT, supra note 129, at 60.
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The qualifications that I think should be required in the ap-
pointment of a federal judge are integrity and professional
competence. I do not share the view of a few people that the
federal judiciary should be representative in the sense that it
should have x number of Hispanics, x number of Negroes, x
number of women. By the very nature of things, that will take
care of itself, and there should be no quota or anything remotely
resembling a quota system in the appointment of federal judges.
Undoubtedly, the President of the United States, in appointing a
judge in the south-western part of the country, is going to take
into account the large Hispanic population; or on the far west
coast he would take into account qualified persons who are of
Asian extraction; or anywhere in the country, he would take
into account members of the bar who are Negroes.219
Few would dispute that Justices Marshall and O'Connor were se-
lected in no small part because of their race and gender, respectively."'
Interestingly, the selections of Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Justices
Samuel Miller, Willis Van Devanter, and Joseph McKenna are no differ-
ent,22" ' although their nominations often are not viewed as representative
appointments.
To return to the central question raised by this Article, how does
one reconcile supporting racial diversity among judges without support-
ing every judicial nominee who is a person of color? This Part addresses
that question, which was raised prominently by the nominations of two
conservative minorities, Clarence Thomas and Miguel Estrada, to the fed-
eral judiciary.
The analysis of judicial nominations may gain much from the law
school admissions process vindicated by the Supreme Court in Grutter v.
BollingetI22 as well as from the jury selection literature.223 Many factors
must be considered when appointing an individual to the bench.
219. GARRY STURGESS & PHILIP CHUBB, JUDGING THE WORLD: LAw AND POLITICS IN
THE WORLD'S LEADING COURTS 298 (1988).
220. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 6; PERRY, supra note 14, at 96-102, 121-24; see
also Thomas R. Marshall, Symbolic Versus Policy Representation on the US. Supreme Court, 55
J. POL. 140, 140-41 (1993) (contending that "symbolic appointments ... are relatively
common").
221. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 6; DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 80-92 (3d ed. 1993); see also PEmRY, supra note 14, at 133
(concluding that in the sixteen nominations that she examined, "representativeness" played
a role twelve times).
222. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20 and Part III.A.
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In the modern political process of selecting judicial nominees, ap-
pointments based strictly on "merit" are largely mythical.114 However, a
loose notion of merit must serve as the floor for any judicial nominee.25
The need for diversity among the judiciary further requires that an indi-
vidual's "representativeness," and particularly her race, play a role as well.
Rather than simply racial background, ties to the community, ideology
judicial philosophy, and other considerations contribute to the view of a
candidate as representative of a minority community.
In staking a defense ofjudicial diversity, however, we decline to take
the untenable position of advocating support for any and all people of
color nominated to the bench. Minorities should not be expected to sup-
port every minority, including nominees who will act in a way they
generally believe to be antithetical to minority interests. For example, Af-
rican Americans should not feel compelled to support the nomination of
a judge such as Justice Thomas simply because he is an African Ameri-
can. 26 Similarly, Latina/os should not feel forced to support the
nomination of someone like Miguel Estrada, an arch-conservative nomi-
nee with virtually no ties to the Latina/o community, simply because he
is Latino.22
Consequently, if racial diversity remains the goal, and if judicial di-
versity is sought in order to ensure that a variety of perspectives are
represented in judicial decision-making, one must defend support for
some people of color but not for others. The need to defend this position
is poignant in light of our agreement with antiessentialists who proclaim
the existence of an amalgam of voices of color.2 8 By definition, such a
panoply will include many voices that may approach issues differently
than a member of the majority group.2"
224. See O'BRIEN, supra note 221, at 65-72; c. Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the
Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. Rrv. 1449 (1997) (criticizing conceptions of
"merit" employed in law school admissions).
225. See PERRY, supra note 14, at 135-38. For an effort to offer objective indicia of
merit in evaluating Supreme Court nominees, see Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tour-
nament ofJudges?, 92 CAL. L. Rav. 299 (2004).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. Some civil rights groups, such as the
Urban League, declined to take a position on the Thomas nomination. See TIMOTsHY M.
PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITAL GAMES: CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND THE
STORY OF A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION 73-80 (1992).
227. See infra text accompanying notes 240-45.
228. See supra text accompany notes 21-22.
229. For example,Justice Thomas had different approaches to the problems at issue in
the Virginia cross burning case as well as the University of Michigan affirmative action
cases than did White Justices who shared his bottom line. See supra text accompanying
notes 41-46.
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A. The Importance of Ideology
Judicial ideology is relevant to the decision whether to support a ju-
dicial nominee who is a person of color. As with jurors, not just any
minority will do in seeking a diverse jury. Advocates for a diverse bench,
including minority advocacy organizations, can seek a more diverse judi-
ciary but decline to support nominations such as those ofJustice Thomas
and Janice Rogers Brown on ideological grounds.
Even assuming that these jurists speak with a voice of color, they ar-
guably have ideological predispositions toward deciding cases in a manner
antithetical to the generally perceived interests of minorities.23 ° Minority
activist groups thus should not support judicial nominees-minority or
not-who are hostile to minority interests. This is true even if the nomi-
nee, like Justice Thomas, speaks with a clear minority voice in some
instances."'
When impaneling a jury, diversity obviously is a consideration for
litigants, especially minority litigants. However, we do not want just any
minority on a jury, such as one who may be predisposed against minority
interests. Similarly, just because one supports racial diversity on the judici-
ary does not mean that one should support the judicial nomination and
confirmation of every racial minority to achieve a certain "racial aes-
thetic.' '232 Deep material interests are at stake and cannot, or should not, be
sacrificed for the sake of racial diversity.
Importantly, minorities in certain circumstances may be tougher on
other minorities.23 3 A variety of explanations may help us understand this
phenomenon. For example, minorities may internalize the stereotypes of
others.23 Alternatively, the embrace of racism against minorities may be
part of attempts by some minorities to assimilate into the mainstream.3 '
These explanations highlight the ripple effects of the fact that there are
voices, not a single voice, of color within minority groups.
230. See supra text accompanying Part I.A.1.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
232. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349, 354 & n.3 (2003) (Thoinas,J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (using the phrase "racial aesthetics" to criticize the
university's quest for a diverse student body).
233. See King, supra note 172, at 97 ("[S]tudies suggest that [B]lack jurors and jurors
of Mexican descent are more likely to assign harsher sentences to convicted defendants of
their own race or ethnicity than [W]hite orAnglojurors.") (footnote omitted).
234. See Laura M. Padilla, "But You're Not a Dirty Mexican": Internalized Oppression,
Latinos & Law, 7 TEx. HisP.J.L. & PoL'y 59 (2001); Laura M. Padilla, Social and Legal Reper-
cussions of Latinos' Colonized Mentality, 53 U. MiAvi L. RE. 769 (1999).
235. See Johnson, Some Thoughts, supra note 77, at 141; Kevin R.Johnson, Immigration
and Latino Identity, 19 CHIcANo-LATINO L. REV. 197,199-206 (1998).
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In short, the ideology of any nominee-racial minority or not-to
the courts is critical.2 36 Any diversity benefits may be outweighed by the
costs to minority communities of nominees with certain ideologies. As in
many policy areas, interest groups often make difficult cost/benefit judg-
ments in making judicial selection decisions. Advocacy groups are in the
best position to make such difficult political calculations, such as whether
having a moderate judge of color is preferable to a liberal White judge.
B. A Multifactored Test
We have argued that a diverse bench would improve decision-
making in multimember bodies, enhance the legitimacy of the bench as a
whole, and render the bench more (and appear more) impartial.237 When
arguing for or against a particular judicial nominee, one must look to
these factors before deciding whether a candidate of color is worthy of
support. In terms of improving the decision-making process, for example,
it seems most important to add judges with different perspectives than
those represented in the current judiciary. True, racial minorities who
share the world view of the majority might add to the perception ofjudi-
cial impartiality. However, they are unlikely to add much in the way of
ideological diversity and different perspectives that improve the decision-
making process.
In evaluating Justice Thomas's performance on the Court, one
commentator observed that:
Other Justices who came to the Court marked as outsiders by
race or religion have struggled to define the appropriate scope
of their empathy for, injustice Thomas's words, "the little guy."
Justice Felix Frankfurter claimed for himself a unique capacity
for empathy with the outsider because of his membership in
(in his words) "the most vilified and persecuted minority in
history" But Frankfurter never developed a jurisprudence of
empathy for the outsider. He became instead, in the words of
one commentator, "an overeager apologist for the existing or-
der'" On the other hand, Justices Louis Brandeis and Thurgood
Marshall more eagerly embraced their status as outsiders in de-
veloping judicial philosophies that were more indulgent of the
claims of the little guy and more suspicious of the existing
236. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THiS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE
CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1985) (calling for careful scru-
tiny of the ideology of Supreme Court nominees). For similar views, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Of Course Ideology Should Matter in Judicial Selection, 7 NExus (2002), at
http://www.nexusjourna.org/2002judicial/chemerinsky.htm.
237. See supra Part II.
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order-even though their views often placed them in lonely
dissent. 131
In other words, a minority jurist is not certain to improve the judicial
decision-making process based on race alone. Minorities generally do not
benefit from judges who are "overeager apologist[s] for the existing or-
der."'239  An individual's ideology, identity, and other characteristics
undoubtedly play a role in how he or she will influence the decision-
making process. Politicians, interest groups, minority communities, and the
public at large therefore must consider such characteristics in determining
whether to support or oppose a nominee.
To state the obvious, not every Latina/o will add a new perspective
to the courts. Miguel Estrada, the Honduran nominated by President
George W Bush for a coveted position on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, is an example of a nominee
who would have added racial but not ideological diversity.4 An avowed
conservative with ties with the Federalist Society, a conservative advocacy
organization, 24 1 Estrada is unlikely to share the views of many Latina/os, a
group that as a whole tends to be liberal in outlook on many issues. By
his own account, Estrada had a most attenuated connection to the
Latina/o community, limited primarily to listening to Hispanic music and
reading Spanish language novels. 42 Refusing to answer questions directed
at his ideology, Estrada exhibited a subtle disdain for the minority activist
groups interviewing him and the Senate committee holding hearings on
his nomination. 43
The goal is for a truly diverse bench, populated with myriad voices
and perspectives. Only such a judiciary will prove legitimate in the eyes of
all communities. Every new judge of color will add marginally to per-
ceived judicial legitimacy. Whether Clarence Thomas or Thurgood
Marshall, Miguel Estrada or Juan Torruella, the appointment of any of
these individuals would add some degree of legitimacy to the bench by
making the courts more representative of different racial groups.
In this way, the confirmation of Miguel Estrada as a judge would
have made the courts a bit more diverse racially and somewhat more le-
238. Muller, supra note 39, at 249.
239. Id.
240. See Kevin R. Johnson, Defense of the Estrada Filibuster: A Judicial Nominee that the
Senate Cannot Judge, FINDLAW'S LEGAL COMMENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
commentary/20030227-johnson.html (Feb. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Johnson, Estrada].
241. See Neil A. Lewis, Stymied by Democrats in Senate, Bush Court Pick Finally Gives
Up, N.YTIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at Al.
242. See Tony Mauro, Hispanic Groups Divided Over Estrada Nomination: Conservative
D.C. Circuit Pick to Face Senate Panel Sept. 26, LEGAL TIis, Sept. 23, 2002, at 1.
243. See Johnson, Estrada, supra note 240.
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gitimate. Simply having a person with a Spanish name and surname
would add diversity to the federal judiciary and tend to lend greater le-
gitimacy to the federal courts in the eyes of the large, and growing,
Latina/o community; such legitimacy would have been magnified in
Estrada's appointment because of the prestige and visibility of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The quest
for inclusion and membership helps explain the support of some Latina/o
advocacy groups for Estrada's confirmation despite his weak ties to the
Latino community and his conservative ideology 44 Moreover, Estrada's
appointment, along with the confirmation of a critical mass of Latina/os,
would clearly reveal that Latina/os share a wide diversity of political opin-
ions,just as Anglos, African Americans, Asian Americans, and other groups
do. 245
However, unlike many other potential Latina/o nominees, the sym-
bolic and legitimacy benefits to Estrada's confirmation may well have
been outweighed by the impacts that he could have on the law affecting
Latina/os, in light of his ultraconservative political ideology. Again,judicial
ideology must be weighed in evaluating the Estrada nomination to un-
derstand the costs to Latina/os. Such cost/benefit calculations are
inherently difficult but must be undertaken by minority activist groups.
The argument for judicial diversity on grounds of institutional le-
gitimacy in fact requires the appointment of people of color to the bench.
Debates over judicial diversity often focus solely on numbers and on how
few people of color serve on the bench. Looking only at numbers is not
enough, however. When considering the racial face of our judiciaries, ille-
gitimacy is a great concern because these institutions do not represent all
communities. The quest for judicial diversity is really a quest for the repre-
sentation of myriad voices on the bench.
It thus is not simply about numbers but also about the legitimacy
gained through representing many voices and communities. In evaluating
the nomination of Miguel Estrada, it became painfully clear that he did not
represent---or in any way have any identification with or by-Latina/o
communities. In this way, the argument for legitimacy is linked to the
argument for improved decision-making. Increasing diversity hopefully
means introducing new perspectives that are traditionally absent in the
judiciary These new perspectives will not only promise to improve the
judicial decision-making process, but in so doing they will help legitimize
the judiciary as well.
244. See Darryl Fears, For Hispanic Groups, A Divide on Estrada: Political, Geographic
Fault Lines Exposed, WASH. PosT, Feb. 20, 2003, at A4; Mauro, supra note 242.
245. A similar "critical mass" argument was one of the justifications offered by the
University of Michigan Law School for the reliance upon race in its affirmative action
program. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319-20 (2003).
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Other Latina/os might pose more difficult questions than Miguel
Estrada for Latina/o advocacy groups deciding whether to support or
oppose judicial nominees. Conservative Latina/os, such as Attorney Gen-
eral Alberto Gonzales, who testify in good faith and have ties to the
Latina/o community would be much more difficult to oppose than
someone with few connections to this community, such as Miguel
Estrada. Rumors have placed Gonzalez, who appears to hold more mod-
erate political views than Estrada's and has ties to the Mexican American
community in Texas, on a list of potential nominees to the Supreme
Court by President Bush.246 His is the sort of nomination that may be
expected in the future-and that may be expected to divide Latina/o ac-
tivist groups."'
In sum, the quest for impartiality-and the public perception of
legitimacy--suggests the need for a representative judiciary, just as it
supports drawing jurors from a cross section of the community. Judges
come to the bench with preconceptions about the law. They filter the
facts of cases through their own personal lenses. As a result, impartiality
demands a diverse bench, so that no one conception of the world domi-
nates all others under the guise of equal application of the law. But
diversity means more than mere numbers; rather it must be understood
that those appointed do, in fact, have diverse preconceptions about the
law and the world. Otherwise, any prospective impartiality will prove
illusory.
CONCLUSION
Greater racial diversity on the bench is a laudable goal. The justice
system benefits when it is represented by a jury that accurately reflects a
cross section of the community because such a jury is perceived as impar-
tial to all racial groups. The system similarly benefits from diversity among
judges, and the system's legitimacy is enhanced in the eyes of the public
by a more racially diverse bench.
246. See Jonathan Darman, Alberto Gonzales: Still Working for Bush, NEwswEEK, Dec.
19, 2003, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3751995/site/newsweek; Toobin,
supra note 8, at 48. In November 2001, President Bush nominated Gonzales for the
United States Attorney General post, which created a good deal of controversy--even
among Latina/os-before he was confirmed. See Eric Lichtblau, Democrats Expect Gonzales
to be Confirmed forJustice Post, N.YTmEs, Nov. 18, 2004, at A28.
247. Gonzales, however, may face opposition based on his legal advice provided in
connection with the "war on terror" and in Iraq, see Peter Smith, White House Lawyer De-
fends US. Actions, COURIER J., Oct. 5, 2004, at 1B, as well as his role in reviewing death
penalty clemency requests for President Bush who was then the governor of Texas. See
Alan Berlow, The Texas Clemency Memos, ATL. MoNTILY,July/Aug. 2003, at 91.
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However, proponents of diversity on the courts should not feel
whipsawed and forced to embrace every minority nominated to serve as a
judge. Many individual factors, such as ideology, judicial temperament,
and life experience, as well as race, remain relevant to whether one is a
suitable for judicial appointment. Just as any minority juror will be judged
on factors other than race, so should prospective minority judges.
Put more bluntly, the ideology of a jurist is important no matter
what his or her race or gender. Many, perhaps most, African Americans,
for example, would rather have nine William Brennans on the Supreme
Court than nine Clarence Thomases. The jury selection process helps us
understand the dynamics at work. As a general proposition, we support
increased racial diversity on juries. However, the individual characteristics
of the perspective juror or judicial nominee in fact do matter; the costs of
a nominee's ideology may outweigh any benefits achieved by appointing
her to diversify the bench if those views are significantly out of step with
the community.
It is self evident that an individual nominee's views and ideology
must be considered, as well as her race and background. However, racial
diversity and ideological diversity often are not separated in the heated
debates over Supreme Court nominees. For each individual nomination,
careful attention must be given to these separate characteristics. Impor-
tantly, an advocate of racial diversity on the judiciary could, as a matter of
principle, decide that any benefits offered by a nominee to the judiciary
from added racial diversity are outweighed by the costs of the individual's
ideological views on important social issues without compromising her
support for increased diversity on the bench.
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